Statistical Modeling of Corrosion Failures in Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines by Cobanoglu, Mustafa Murat
STATISTICAL MODELING OF CORROSION FAILURES IN NATURAL GAS 
TRANSMISSION PIPELINES 
 
 
A Thesis 
by 
MUSTAFA MURAT COBANOGLU 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
 
Chair of Committee,  Ivan D. Damnjanovic 
Co-Chair of Committee, Nasir Gharaibeh 
Committee Members, Ken Reinschmidt 
 Halit Uster 
Head of Department, Robin Autenrieth 
 
May 2014 
 
 
Major Subject: Civil Engineering 
 
Copyright 2014 Mustafa Murat Cobanoglu
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Natural gas pipelines are a critical component of the U.S. energy infrastructure. 
The safety of these pipelines plays a key role for the gas industry. Therefore, the 
understanding of failure characteristics and their consequences are very important for 
designing future operations, operating expenditure, and maintenance decisions. 
The oil and gas industry spends billions of dollars annually for the corrosion-
related cost of the transmission pipelines, the costs which increases due to aging and 
deterioration processes in pipeline networks. Therefore, pipeline operators need to 
rethink their corrosion prevention strategies. These results of corrosion failures are 
forcing the companies to develop accurate maintenance models based on failure 
frequency. Statistical methods for modeling pipeline failures and proper maintenance 
decisions play a key role in future safety of lines, to reduce the rate of occurrence of 
failures, and the cost-effective operation of pipelines. 
 This thesis is focused on two challenges. The first challenge is to estimate the 
failure rate of natural gas transmission pipeline networks from the previous incidents’ 
data in the United States. A specific objective of this part is to determine the 
characterization of the failure modes of the transmission pipelines, and to develop the 
statistical models based on the reliability of a repairable system. The second challenge is 
to develop the optimal preventive replacement actions by using well-developed 
optimization models. The objective of the second part is to choose appropriate 
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maintenance policies based on the statistical models and to find the optimal maintenance 
policies. 
In this thesis, two of the most commonly applied stochastic models, which are 
the homogeneous Poisson process and the power law process, are used for the estimation 
of the failure rate. The point and interval estimators of the failure intensity function are 
provided and the accuracy of the stochastic models is tested for each determined failure 
mode. Finally, appropriate maintenance models will be presented for planning 
preventive maintenance and replacement activities for a repairable and maintainable 
system. It is assumed that pipeline systems could be restored to operation requirements 
by some minimal repair process instead of replacement after each failure.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Modern economies need energy to produce goods and services. Support 
transportation and provide heating and other life to communities. Pipelines are key to an 
effective transportation and distribution of liquid and gas products. 
Pipelines represent a dominant means of transporting gas from their upstream 
location to the downstream. While the oil and gas industry uses other transportation 
methods such as oil-gas tankers and tank trucks/railroad tank cars, pipelines are the 
preferred choice. There are two main reasons why pipelines are an important 
transportation method for oil and gas products. First, pipelines are capable of 
transporting large amounts of gas and liquid over long distances (Thompson, 2004). For 
example, replacing a modest-sized oil pipeline, which can transport 150,000 barrels per 
day, with tanker trucks would require 750 trucks, and with railroad cars would require 
225 cars loads per day (AOPL, 2014). Second, the pipelines’ design enables them to 
carry oil and gas products quickly, safely, and cost-efficiently to end-use markets when 
compared to other forms of transportation (Mohitpour et al., 2010; U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2013; Mohitpour et al., 2007).  
Pipeline systems can be divided into three major categories: oil pipelines, natural 
gas pipelines, and others (water, chemical, etc.). The purpose of oil and gas pipelines is 
similar. However, the operation processes and the equipment are different (Mohitpour et 
al., 2010). Gas transmission pipelines use compressors to provide high-pressure for long-
distance transport and are connected to distribution systems that deliver the gas via low-
2 
 
pressure and small-diameter pipes that go through the “city gate” valving and the 
metering station. On the other hand, oil and petroleum product pipelines use pumps to 
push oil to tankage or storage facilities (Mohitpour et al., 2010). 
Complex engineering and economical analysis are required for pipeline system 
designs. While designing the facility, pipeline engineers must consider all environmental 
effects, characteristics of oil and gas, volume of fluid, the length of a pipeline, and others 
variables. After complex studies are completed, engineers design the system by 
speculating the material type, diameter, wall thickness, route, power requirements, 
prevention methods, maintenance schedule, etc. (Mohitpour et al., 2007).  
Although pipeline systems are the most economical, the most efficient, and the 
safest way of transportation, there have been an increasing number of incidents in the 
pipeline industry. The failures of the pipeline system can lead to events such as: injuries, 
fatalities, environmental issues, product loss, and property damages (Thompson, 2004). 
As a result of the increasing trends, the reliability of pipelines is a major concern of the 
operators. Therefore, pipeline operators are interested in understanding the failure 
characteristics of an individual pipeline asset and all the variables affecting the 
pipeline’s performance (Baker Jr., 2008; Thompson, 2004). 
A systematic approach for pipeline safety is required to reduce the number of 
incidents. Each company is required to provide a systematic approach to reduce the 
number of failures, improve system reliability, increase the system’s safety, and reduce 
maintenance costs. The best way to reach this target is the adoption of an incident-free 
operation policy (American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), 2010). 
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Effective maintenance strategies are the most important part of the systematic 
approach to pipeline safety. These strategies are extremely important to avoid failures 
during operation. A number of policies have been established to improve system 
reliability and to prevent the occurrence of system failure, and to reduce maintenance 
costs (Wang and Pham, 2006). The first step is to determine system reliability (Wang 
and Pham, 2006). Failure modes can be determined using statistical prediction models. 
These prediction models help the operators to minimize or eliminate any risks. The 
second step is to establish the optimal maintenance strategies. The purpose of the 
optimization problem is to minimize the overall costs of system operation and to 
maximize the overall reliability of the system by maintenance. Appropriate maintenance 
strategies can improve the system’s reliability.  
However, estimating system reliability and establishing optimal maintenance 
frequency is a difficult task. The failure rate, which is used to express reliability of a 
system, is affected by many factors such as the environmental conditions (soil type, 
onshore, offshore, etc.), internal variables (the amount of the liquid water, chemical 
components of natural gas, etc.), structural characteristics (the material, diameter, wall 
thickness, etc.), and maintenance variables (protection methods, frequency, etc.). These 
include a set of variables affecting a pipeline performance is a very difficult task because 
of the very complicated nature of it. Similarly, finding optimal preventive maintenance 
policies in multi-component systems requires complex studies. 
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This section introduces the overall motivation for the study. In addition, this 
section presents the goals and objectives, summarizes the contributions, and outlines the 
organization of the thesis.  
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Pipeline systems are the most popular method for transporting natural gas. 
Pipelines distribute almost 70 percent of oil and gas products worldwide (Mohitpour et 
al., 2010). Also, pipeline networks are growing every year due to new pipelines’ 
construction in new areas.  
Pipelines require the highest level of reliability due to safety concerns. In fact, 
pipeline systems are becoming more complex and being located excessively near high-
density populated areas (“high-consequence areas” (HCAs)). Any release of hydro-
carbon in HCAs could have adverse consequences and great environmental impacts. 
Therefore, safety is the highest priority for governments and the operators (Hernandez-
Rodriguez et al., 2007). 
Due to economic and public safety concerns, pipeline systems are operated 
continually as possible as without an incident. Effective maintenance strategies require 
reaching this objective. The first fundamental step of effective maintenance actions is to 
determine system reliability. Reliability of the pipeline systems can be formulated by 
mathematical models. Mathematical models allow for prediction of future failure 
behaviors and estimate the probability of pipeline failures (Blischke and Murthy, 2000). 
The key to application of reliability to pipeline networks is acquisition, analysis, 
and interpretation of data. Therefore, effective and efficient collection of data and 
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description and analysis of data plays an important role in application of reliability 
(Blischke and Murthy, 2000). There are several types of data gathering techniques that 
can be used in reliability analyst. There are two main approaches: experimental data and 
failure data. Experimental data gains data from samples from well-defined populations. 
Although experimental data provides a good indication of the actual condition of the 
pipeline, it is commonly considered too costly. For pipeline networks, it requires taking 
out a pipe sample for the entire network. On the other hand, in most cases, failure data 
can be used in reliability analysis. Failure data has many advantages. First, failure data 
would go a long way in helping the operators not just to predict the pattern of these 
untoward incidents but also to provide them with a comprehensive understanding of 
what has gone wrong in the pipeline systems. Second, gathering failure data is easier 
than experimental data. For example, the historical failure data sources for the United 
States, Canada, and Europe are open access (OA) (Andersen and Misund, 1983; 
Papadakis, 1999; Blischke and Murthy, 2000). 
The U.S. Department of Transportation-Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (PHMSA) maintains a database on pipeline incidents. PHMSA has been 
collecting these data from American pipeline operators since 1986. The PHMSA’s 
database provides invaluable information such as pipeline and operator information, 
failure causes, consequences of these incidents, cathodic protection conditions, coating 
conditions, property damage, year of installation information, and etc. However, a 
number of items are missing. For example, it is very difficult to find information on 
operators and pipeline systems such as the environmental conditions, total section length 
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of pipelines, design considerations, maintenance frequency, inspection techniques, soil 
conditions, etc. 
The key challenge for the operators is to develop reliable models to estimate the 
number of future failures. The results of reliability models help the operators achieve 
this goal. First, the operators can minimize the operational risks such as injury, fatality, 
economical, and etc. Second, the operators can mitigate and control most pipeline 
failures. Third, they can produce safer operations. Finally, they can decide on effective 
maintenance procedures and timing.  For example, if maintenance is scheduled too early, 
the failure of the system cannot be detected and repaired. If maintenance is scheduled 
too late, the pipeline systems pass to an acceptable safety level to the public and 
environment, so the failure will likely occur (Hong, 1997). 
However, developing task prediction models to estimate failure rate for the 
pipelines system is a difficult. Pipelines do not have constant failure rate along its entire 
length because the material, surrounding environmental, and its operational conditions 
are not uniform for the whole pipeline (Røstum, 2000). Moreover, the pipeline systems 
consist of many subcomponents such as valves, metering stations, and compressors. 
Wang and Pham (2006) imply that the failures of different subcomponents in 
multicomponent system may not be independent failure dependency. Therefore, it is 
very difficult to model all factors that affect pipeline’s performance. To address this 
problem pipeline systems can be defined as a group of pipelines (network level), which 
are modeled by the same point stochastic process (Ascher and Feingold, 1984; Caleyo et 
al., 2008). 
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It is important to note that the pipeline system can be considered as a system that 
is repaired upon failure by emergency repair. Hence, it exists as “bad-as-old” type of 
behavior following application of maintenance actions (Stillman, 2003). The arrival of 
the system failures over time can be treated as a stochastic point process. Therefore, 
reliability of the systems could be expressed as a failure rate for repairable systems 
(Mohitpour et al., 2010). There are two common reliability approaches to model 
repairable systems: the homogeneous Poisson process (HPP) and the nonhomogeneous 
Poisson process (NHPP). The NHPP is a popular method to model the failure process of 
repairable systems such as natural gas transmission pipelines (Krivtsov, 2007). 
The next step of pipeline safety is the development of the optimal maintenance 
models. Based on failure characteristics, the optimal preventive maintenance models can 
be established. In the past several decades, a number of different preventive maintenance 
optimization models have been proposed (Wang, 2002). As with the development of 
reliability model, the development of the optimal preventive maintenance models is 
difficult. The success of the models depends on the prediction of future pipeline failures, 
the reliability criteria, the cost of improvements, and maintenance degrees of the system 
(Thompson, 2004). 
1.2 Research Goal and Objectives 
The main motivation for this work comes from developing a better understanding 
of the complexity of characterizing failure behavior and finding optimal preventive 
maintenance decision in natural gas pipeline networks. 
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This thesis focuses on significant failures on the natural gas transmission 
pipelines that lead to adverse consequences. This thesis has two main goals. The first 
goal is to develop a reliability model for pipeline integrity and safety. The second goal is 
to choose optimal maintenance policies based on reliability models. 
The objectives of this thesis are described as follow:   
1. Characterize the failure modes of natural gas transmission pipeline systems in the 
United States. The characterizing process covers time-dependent failure modes 
which causes more significant consequences; 
2. Develop the statistical models to estimate the failure rate of a natural gas pipeline 
network by the analysis of observed failure data, which come from the American 
natural gas pipeline operators. The statistical models need to consider the effect 
of preventive maintenance and rehabilitation actions; 
3. Determine optimal maintenance policy in a realistic way for pipeline system. 
Moreover, the aim of this thesis to present mathematical models for scheduling 
preventive maintenance and replacement activities.  
1.3 Research Contributions 
The main contribution of this thesis is to develop mathematical models to 
estimate failure rate of the pipeline network and to develop a model to find optimal 
preventive maintenance and replacement decisions to literature. Based on the complete 
literature review, only handful of schedule addressed this problem. 
Other specific contributions of this thesis to the gas pipeline industry are in following 
areas:  
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1. Understanding of the time-dependent failure characteristics of natural gas 
transmission pipeline systems; 
2. Development of a reliability model to predict failure rate; 
3. Development of some optimal preventive maintenance and replacement models 
that can help minimize the overall costs of system operation and maximize the 
overall reliability. Moreover, the developed models help companies make more 
accurate maintenance decisions and eliminate and eliminate or reduce future 
operating expenditure (OPEX). 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
This thesis is organized in seven sections. Motivations, research goals and 
objectives, research contributions, and the thesis outline are introduced in this section. 
The relevant background literature for natural gas pipeline systems, causes of failures, 
statistical models used for modeling failures on natural gas transmission pipeline 
networks, preventive maintenance methods, modeling of rehabilitation and replacement 
decision, and optimization models for maintenance are reviewed and presented in 
Section 2. Section 3 presents the applied methodology used in reliability and optimal 
maintenance models. Moreover, this section introduces selection of accurate statistical 
models, statistical representation of the pipeline systems, and data selection and 
assumptions. The incident data sources and data prediction or preparations from several 
pipeline networks in the U.S are described in Section 4. In Section 5, the formulation 
and the solution approach of the relevant statistical models are presented. In the same 
section, a number of expected failures model are estimated. The developed statistical 
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models and the models’ result are then applied to maintenance optimization and the 
equipment replacement decisions in Section 6. In the final Section summarizes the key 
findings and conclusions, and presents recommendations for future research work.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This section presents reviews of the existing literature in four major areas within 
the scope of this thesis: pipeline systems function, failure modes in gas transmission 
pipelines, modeling pipeline failures, and preventive maintenance and replacements 
methods. The first subsection presents general information related to pipeline systems. 
More specifically, the function of natural gas transmission pipeline in the Unites States 
discusses. The second subsection describes causes and consequences of pipeline failures. 
In the third subsection, the existing reliability analysis’ models are reviewed for 
estimating pipeline failures. In the fourth subsection, the existing maintenance and 
replacement models are discussed. In the final subsection, the previous studies that 
focused on effects of rehabilitation and replacement decisions are reviewed. 
2.1 Natural Gas Pipeline Systems 
According to a recent estimation from the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA), global energy demand will increase more than 85 percent from 2010 to 2040. 
Strong economic growth and expanding world population create this demand. Although 
renewable energy sources and nuclear power are the world's fastest-growing energy 
sources, fossil fuels remain and provide almost 80 percent of the world energy supply 
through 2040 (Stambouli and Traversa, 2002; U.S. Energy Information Administration 
Office of Energy Analysis, 2013). 
Natural gas is the fastest-growing fossil fuel. According to the EIA data (2013), 
the gas consumption has steadily increases by 1.7 percent per year. If are looks at the 
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reasons for this, natural gas has a clean consumption characteristics. In other words, it is 
more environmentally friendly compared to other fossil fuels (Obanijesu, 2009). Further, 
natural gas plays a highly important role as a power generation fuel and is present 
abundance in the U.S. (Obanijesu and Sonibare, 2005; U.S. Energy Information 
Administration Office of Energy Analysis, 2013). 
The pipeline systems are the best way to transport natural gas to the customers. 
There are many reasons why pipelines are a popular means of transportation. First, 
distribution of natural gas with pipelines are a safe and an economically efficient 
transportation method of carrying gas over long distances as compared to oil and gas 
tankers, trucks/railroad tank cars, and other transportation methods (Papadakis, 1999; 
Sun et al., 2000). Mohitpour et al. (2010) noted that the pipeline safety was statistically 
proved this. In 1998, the total number of fatalities due to pipeline incidents in the U.S. 
was twenty-seven ppm, which is much lower than the other transportation methods. 
According to the EIA (2013), “two-thirds of the lower 48 States in the U.S. are almost 
totally dependent upon the interstate pipeline system for their supplies of natural gas” 
(Mohitpour et al., 2010; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013; Andersen and 
Misund, 1983). 
The key components of the gas pipeline systems include production wells, 
gathering lines (pipes), separation facilities or processing plants, transmission pipes, 
valves, metering stations, aboveground or underground storage facilities, compressor 
stations, metering stations, city gate at distribution center, distribution pipes, regulator 
station, etc. Figure 2.1 illustrates the major components of this system: a natural gas 
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production (gathering), transmission, storage, and distribution system (Thompson, 2004; 
Mohitpour et al., 2010). 
The pipeline operation processes include the following steps. First, pumping of 
gas from the wells to gathering lines. Gathering lines then deliver the natural gas to 
processing facilities to remove undesirable chemical components. After the natural gas is 
separated, clean gas is pumped into the transmission lines via compression stations. At 
the end of the transmission lines, the city gates connect to distribution pipelines. The 
purpose of the city gate is to measure gas via metering stations and to deliver low-
pressure gas to the customers using small-diameter pipes (Mohitpour et al., 2010).  
Transmission pipelines form the key component of overall pipeline system 
because transmission pipelines are the main connection between gathering lines and 
distribution lines (Papadakis, 1999). Although, more than 1,000 companies lead an 
operation in the transmission lines in the U.S., only, sixty major natural gas pipeline 
operators are responsible for 80 percent of all natural gas transmission networks in the 
U.S. (PHMSA, 2013c; PHMSA, 2013d; Hereth et al., 2000). 
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Figure 2.1 Components of a Natural Gas Pipeline System 
The transmission pipelines are normally high-pressure, large-diameter, and 
buried underground or underwater because transmission pipelines are passing across 
states and counties (Papadakis, 1999). For this reason, pipes should be durable. 
Therefore, the majority of materials of the natural gas transmission pipelines are made of 
carbon steel (93 percent), other materials (6 percent), and plastic and concrete (1 
percent). Figure 2.2 shows a distribution of natural gas transmission pipelines materials 
in PHMSA dataset. Ranges of these diameters are from 2 to 48 inches. 
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Figure 2.2 Distribution of Materials of Pipeline for Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines 
from 1986-2012 Source: DOT/PHMSA Pipeline Incidents Data 
Although pipelines are the safest and the most economical way of the carrying 
natural gas, any release on pipelines can have an adverse effect on employees, 
customers, the public, or the environment (American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
(ASME), 2010). More specifically, the consequences of pipeline failures depend on 
where the hydro-carbon release occurs. Pipeline safety regulations use a specific 
description to identify areas where a release could have serious negative consequences. 
The name of this concept is “High Consequence Areas” (HCAs). Majority of pipelines 
are located in “high-consequence areas” (HCAs). Thompson (2004) emphasized that 60 
percent of the pipelines are in HCAs. For transmission pipelines, it is almost 261,000 
miles of natural gas pipelines in NCAs (PHMSA, 2013a; PHMSA, 2013b).  
Pipeline incidents can lead to many important consequences other than costs. 
Injuries and fatalities are the two obvious ones (Simonoff et al., 2010). According to 
93%
6%
1%
0%
STEEL (CARBON STEEL)
OTHER
MATERIAL OTHER THAN 
CARBON STEEL OR 
PLASTIC
PLASTIC
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DOT/PHMSA Pipeline Incidents Data, a total of 75 fatalities, 334 injuries, and 
$1,977,571,106 of property damage has occurred due to failure of natural gas 
transmission pipelines from 1986 to 2012 (PHMSA, 2013d). An illustrating example of 
this occurred on August 24, 1996. A butane pipeline exploded near by Lively, Texas. 
Two persons lost their lives as a result of a failure. After the incident, engineers 
concluded that the cause of failure was external corrosion due to inadequate cathodic 
protection (Riemer and Orazem, 2000).  
Due to an increasing number of incidents and their consequences, reliability of 
the pipeline system is becoming crucial for the operators and public in general. Public 
safety concerns have been a driving force for new regulations for managing pipeline 
operations (Thompson, 2004). First, pipeline operators require following the Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR) title 49, Part 192 and 195. 49 CFR Part 192 is titled 
“Transportation of Natural and other Gas by Pipeline – Minimum Federal Safety 
Standards” which was established in August of 1970. This regulation prescribes 
minimum safety requirements for the pipeline industry. More specifically, this regulation 
specifies a minimum design requirement, material and qualification, internal and 
external protection requirements, etc. (Parker, 2004). 
The last significant effort in improvement public safety was taken on December 
17, 2002. President George W. Bush and the 107th Congress passed the “Pipeline Safety 
Improvement Act of 2002” into law. Under this legislation, the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT) issued regulations prescribing the standards guidance for 
implementation of new transmission integrity management programs. Also, the law sets 
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a minimum requirement for integrity management programs for gas transmission 
pipelines located in “High Consequence Areas” (HCAs) (Baker Jr., 2009). 
Following the 2002 legislation, a number of codes, regulations, and standards are 
established to develop more systematic approach to public, pipeline, and environmental 
safety. The purpose of these codes and standards are to provide a systematic, 
comprehensive, and integrated approach to managing the safety and integrity of pipeline 
systems (Papadakis, 1999). There are two main guidelines that are used by the gas 
industry: American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) B31.8-2010 “Gas 
Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems” and ASME B31.8S-2010 “Managing 
System Integrity of Gas Pipelines” provided by ASME. The ASME B31.8-2010 defines 
requirements for the safe design and construction of pressure piping. The purpose of the 
ASME B31.8S-2010 is to provide the operator general information to develop and 
implement an effective integrity management program. 
The general pipeline industry’s goal is to provide a reliable and safe delivery of 
gas to the end users without an adverse effect on the environment and the public in 
general. This is a fundamental objective for all gas operators. To reach this aim, the gas 
operators have to apply the integrity process by reliability and safety engineers. In other 
words, pipeline operators have adopted an incident-free operation policy. Details of the 
pipeline integrity management system are defined in the ASME B31.8S-2010 (American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), 2010).  
According to the ASME B31.8S-2010, the integrity management of the pipeline 
systems involves several steps. The first step is to understand failure mechanisms and 
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their consequences. The second step is to develop reliable physical models that describe 
failure mechanisms using experimental data or the number of previous failures. The third 
step is to analyze the models with collected data from the perspective of risk and 
integrity. The fourth step is to find a solution to mitigate or prevent failures by 
inspection, maintenance, and replacement actions including preparing a plan for future 
operations. The following subsection summarizes the previous studies in failure 
characteristics of natural gas pipelines. 
2.2 Causes of Pipeline Failures 
The first fundamental step in managing the integrity of a natural gas pipeline 
systems is to understand failure modes of pipeline incidents. Enumerating all pipeline 
failures modes is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, this thesis provides a general 
information and explanation about pipeline failure causes.  
According to the ASME B31.8S-2010, the natural gas pipeline failure 
mechanisms are classified under 22 root causes by the Pipeline Research Committee 
International (PRCI) (7 American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) 2010). A 
list of possible threats that cause pipeline failures is given in Table 2.1. These 22 threats 
have been grouped into 9 categories of related failure types based on their nature and 
growth characteristics. Engineers shall correctly address threats at Table 2.1 for risk 
assessment, integrity management, and mitigation activities. Each threat shall be 
considered individually because each threat has its own mitigation strategies (American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), 2010). 
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The threats to pipeline integrity are classified in three main categories: time-
dependent, stable, and time-independent. The time-dependent threats involve corrosion 
failures. The stable category covers equipment; welding-fabrication related, as well as 
manufacturing-related defects. The last category includes third party or mechanical 
damage, incorrect operational procedure, outside force, and weather-related and outside 
force failure. According to the statistics from PHMSA, the most common known cause 
of incidents is due to damage by the outside force (26 percent), corrosion (24 percent), 
material failure or construction defect (20 percent), natural force (6 percent), 
miscellaneous (4 percent), other or unknown causes (11 percent), and the rest of the 
causes (16 percent). Figure 2.3 illustrates a summary of the distributions of significant 
failures by causes (American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), 2010; 
Papadakis, 1999). 
Figure 2.3 Causes of Significant Pipeline Incidents in Natural Gas Transmission 
Pipelines from 1986-2012 Source: DOT/PHMSA Pipeline Incidents Data 
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Table 2.1 Whole Threats to Pipeline Integrity Source: ASME B31.8S-2010 
Time-related 
Defect Types 
Failure Types Based on Their 
Nature and Growth 
Characteristics 
Root Causes 
Time-
Dependent 
External corrosion  
Internal corrosion  
Stress corrosion cracking  
Stable 
Manufacturing-related defects 
Defective pipe seam 
Defective pipe 
Welding/fabrication related 
Defective pipe girth weld 
(circumferential) 
Defective fabrication weld 
Wrinkle bend or buckle 
Stripped threads/broken 
pipe/coupling failure 
Equipment 
Gasket O-ring failure 
Control/relief equipment 
malfunction 
Seal/pump packing failure 
Miscellaneous 
Time-
Independent 
Third party/mechanical damage 
Damage inflicted by first, 
second, or third parties  
Previously damaged pipe  
Vandalism 
Incorrect operational procedure  
Weather-related and outside force 
Cold weather 
Lightning 
Heavy rains or floods 
Earth movement 
Failure mechanisms can occurs at different stages of pipeline life cycle. The rate 
of occurrence of failures (ROCOF) is often described as a “bathtub curve” (Muhlbauer, 
2004). The bathtub curve shown in Figure 2.4 is a theoretical curve that represents the 
failure behavior of a system for repairable systems (Ascher and Feingold, 1984). Facility 
life cycle is divided into three main phases. First phase of the graph is called “burn-in-
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phase”. This phase represents early lives of the system, failures occur at a relatively high 
rate, since the stable defect type causes failures (Muhlbauer, 2004). From Table 2.1, 
manufacturing-related defects, welding/fabrication related, and equipment failure types 
are observed in the burn-in-phase. These failures may be eliminated when operators start 
operating the pipe. The second phase is called “constant failure phase”. This period 
represents random failures such as third party damage, weather-related and outside force, 
and incorrect operational problems. Failure rate is fairly constant on the phase. The last 
zone is “wear-out phase”. The components of pipeline complete their useful service life 
in this zone, so failure frequency starts to increase due to time-dependent (corrosion and 
fatigue) failure (Røstum, 2000; Muhlbauer, 2004; Nachlas, 2005). 
 
Figure 2.4 Repairable System Bathtub Curve 
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Companies and researchers have extensively studied the causes of pipeline 
failures (Thompson, 2004; Baker Jr., 2008; Baker Jr., 2009). The main sources of data 
are the annual incident reports that are produced by governments, non-profit 
organizations, researchers, and institutions (Andersen and Misund, 1983; European Gas 
Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG), December 2011). The purpose of these studies is 
to provide basic information about pipeline failures, frequency, and to spread awareness 
on pipeline safety. For example, essential information of incidents such as frequency, 
nature of incidents, and causes of failures are available for the United States, Canada, 
and Europe, from PHMSA, the Canadian National Energy Board (NEB), and the 
European Gas pipeline Incident data Group (EGIG), respectively (Baker Jr., 2009). An 
illustrating example of these reports is reported incidents that have been collected by the 
fifteen major gas transmission system operators in Europe since 1970, were analyzed by 
the European Gas pipeline Incident data Group (EGIG, 2008) (Baker Jr., 2009). It is 
important to note that those analyses are very useful for researchers. However, each 
pipeline system has its own designed, so databases should not be compared with each 
other easily.  
Previous studies show that wear-out phase is the most important phase for 
maintenance and renewal strategies (Røstum, 2000; Papadakis, 1999). Pipeline failures 
frequency starts to increase on wear-out phase due to time. Moreover, pipeline operators 
seek for options to extend the life of the pipeline system with accurate maintenance 
decisions. As, most of the studies focus on the failures happening in the wear-out phase 
(Kermani and Harrop, 2008; Song, 2011; Gomes et al., 2013). 
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In the gas industry, the corrosion is the most common threat to pipeline integrity 
in wear-out phase (Thompson, 2004; Ahmad et al., 2011). Corrosion leads to leaks and 
ruptures (Baker Jr., 2008). Stated in other words, corrosion represents a process that 
increases probability of failures over time (Gomes et al., 2013). Baker Jr. (2009) implied 
that corrosion has been responsible for almost 23 percent of significant failures. 
Moreover, 40 to 65 significant corrosion incidents per year were observed onshore and 
offshore gas transmission pipelines from 1988 to 2008 in the U.S. The EGIG report 
(2008) showed that corrosion was the second most important failure cause after external 
interference failures. 
From the operation point of view, the failures due to corrosion represent the 
biggest problem for pipeline operators. Corrosion costs approximately $5.4 to $8.6 
billion annually to the transmission pipeline operators (Thompson, 2004). Annual 
operation and maintenance cost associated with corrosion is 15 percent of total operation 
and maintenance cost. According to Baker’s report (2008), corrosion leads to $7 billion 
of total cost to the oil and gas industry annually. 
Corrosion is a process of destruction or deterioration of a material because of the 
reaction with its environment (Patel, 1969; Baker Jr., 2008). In other words, corrosion is 
chemical or electrochemical oxidation of metals in reaction with an oxidant. Corrosion 
on the wall of the steel pipeline may occur anytime internally or externally (Thompson, 
2004). 
Well-developed reliability models depend on failure characteristics; therefore 
cause of corrosion should be understood well. Corrosion depends on several factors. For 
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example, internal corrosion occurs when corrosive liquids are carried through the 
pipelines (Thompson, 2004). In detail, internal corrosion depends on the amount of the 
liquid water in the natural gas and chemical components of gas such as carbon dioxide 
(CO2), hydrogen sulfide (H2S), oxygen (O2), flow velocity, density, temperature, surface 
condition of the steel, and presence of bacteria in the natural gas. Those factors cause 
different internal corrosion types like uniform corrosion, pitting or crevice corrosion, 
erosion-corrosion, and microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC) (Thompson, 2004; 
Song, 2011; Ahmad et al., 2011). Conversely, external corrosion mainly occurs due to 
soil environment (types, moisture, level of salts, or bacteria), coating degradation 
(disbandment) or local damage of the external coatings (holiday), inadequate cathodic 
protection (CP), and alternating current or direct current interferences (Rajani and 
Kleiner, 2001). 
The main problem is the corrosion cannot be controlled fully, as pipelines 
interact with its environment that naturally triggers corrosion process. However, the 
corrosion process can be mitigated with proper corrosion prevention strategies (Alfon et 
al., 2012). These strategies relate to the models that formulate the expected number of 
failures in future. Therefore, the estimation of number of failures plays a fundamental 
role for future operation. The expected number of failures can be predicted with 
statistical models. The following subsection summarizes the previous research in 
statistical modeling. 
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2.3 Statistical Models to Predict Pipeline Failures 
Modeling of the pipeline systems’ failures is the second step in reliability 
analysis of pipeline networks (Røstum, 2000). Reliability analysis is commonly used for 
describing the failure behavior of a system. Therefore, reliability plays a key role to 
improve system performance. A good prediction of the expected number of failures can 
be used in an economic analysis of repair versus replacement option. Statistical models 
can help companies develop more accurate maintenance decisions and eliminate or 
reduce future operating expenditure (OPEX). Therefore, pipeline operators can avoid 
unnecessary operation such as early repair or removal of a pipeline coating (Røstum, 
2000). 
The system reliability depends on system characteristics that in case of pipelines 
can be defined as non-repairable and repairable. A repairable system was defined as: “ a 
system which, after failure to perform at least one of its required functions, can be 
restored to performing all of its required functions by any methods, other than 
replacement of the entire system” by Ascher and Feingold (1984). 
Majority pipeline system repairs typically involve a replacement of only a very 
small component or part of a system rather than replacing the entire system because 
repairing the pipes is the most practical and economical rehabilitation approach. The 
natural gas transmission pipeline networks therefore are considered to be repairable 
systems (Rigdon and Basu, 2000; Røstum, 2000; Caleyo et al., 2008). For example, 
Røstum (2000) evaluated statistical methods for modeling pipe failures for individual 
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pipe in a water distribution network. The water pipeline networks are considered to be 
repairable systems (Røstum, 2000). 
The measures of system reliability involve the specification of probability 
distributions (Nachlas, 2005). There are some of the commonly used probability 
distributions for repairable systems such as the exponential, Weibull, and gamma. The 
selection of proper distribution is important for good prediction the probability of failure 
in a certain interval. The Weibull distribution is a good choice for repairable systems. 
First, it is probably the most widely used distribution for the life lengths of very many 
devices (Nachlas, 2005). Second, the Weibull distribution is related to the power law 
process, which is a commonly used model for repairable systems (Rigdon and Basu, 
2000). Another advantage of the Weibull distribution is that it provides a graphical plot 
that illustrates cumulative probability of failure against the age to failure (Mohitpour et 
al., 2007). The cumulative failure rate plot’s slope is beta that is defined as shape 
parameter. Beta >1 indicates increase in wear-out failures, beta = 1 shows constant 
failure rate, and beta<1 denotes a decreasing failure rate on the “bathtub curve” 
(Mohitpour et al., 2007). 
The pattern of failures, which denotes the times between successive failures of a 
single repairable system, is very important for reliability analysis (Ascher and Feingold, 
1984). There are two mathematical models for defining the pattern: stochastic point 
processes and differential equations. Ascher and Feingold (1984) defined the stochastic 
point process as: “a mathematical model for a physical phenomenon characterized by 
failures events distributed randomly in time”. The most popular stochastic point 
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processes, which can be applied to repairable systems, are the homogeneous Poisson 
process (NPP), the nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP), the renewal process, and 
superimposed renewal process (SRP) (Ascher and Feingold, 1984). Also, Caleyo et al. 
(2008) emphasized that the pipeline systems refer to a group of natural gas pipelines, 
which are modeled by the same point stochastic process. In contrast, differential 
equations are quite different than the point process approaches. These equations are very 
useful for reflecting known underlying mechanisms, which contribute to reliability 
growth (Ascher and Feingold, 1984). 
The ROCOF plays an important role in selecting a model for a repairable system. 
The ROCOF of the pipeline systems contains the information about the likelihood of a 
failure at any time t and how the system ages over time. In other words, the ROCOF 
measures reliability of a repairable system (Rigdon and Basu, 2000). 
The selection of appropriate repairable system models depends on how the 
system is affected by failures and repairs (Rigdon and Basu, 2000). In general there are 
five repair (maintenance) actions: minimal, renewal (or prefect), imperfect, worse, and 
the worst repair (Wang and Pham, 2006). Rigdon and Basu (2000) defined the minimal 
repair as “the repair done on a system leaves the system in exactly the same condition as 
it was just before the failure”. In the same book, they defined renewal (or perfect) repair 
as; “the system is brought to a like new state after the repair”. In other words, it refers to 
the “good-as-new”. It is assumed that imperfect repair restores the system operation 
condition somewhere between “as good as new” and “as bad as old”. The rest of repair 
actions lead to the system fail or breakdown (Wang and Pham, 2006). Rigdon and Basu 
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(2000) state that the minimal repair model leads to the NHPP and the renewal repair 
model leads to the renewal process. 
Although, the renewal assumption represents many maintenance situations such 
as single cell components, a large proportion of the practical maintenance situations are 
not well represented in the renewal assumption. As Coetzee (1997) emphasized minimal 
repair represents the majority of the maintenance situations.  
Louit et al. (2009) imply that for complex systems such as distribution networks 
each component has different failure modes. Repair actions are generally specific for 
each failed part. Each failure affects only one small section of the entire system; 
therefore, repair action does not have a significant effect on the complete system’s 
probability of failure. Due to fact that, repair actions leave the rest of the system’s failure 
rate unchanged. In this kind of situation, the failure pattern of the system can be 
commonly represented by NHPP. NHPP assumes that maintenance (repair) actions 
return the system to its previous state. This is referred to as minimal repair (Louit et al., 
2009). Røstum (2000) explained this situation for water pipes networks; pipeline 
systems could be restored to operation requirements by some minimal repair process 
other than replacement of the entire system. Therefore, pipeline system’s reliability, after 
repair process, is defined as “bad-as-old”. The risk of the entire pipeline system would 
only be modified after a significant maintenance operation, such as recoating of the 
entire system.  Due to the behavior of the pipeline system, repairable system assumption 
is reasonable with minimal repairs only. This assumption causes that system reliability is 
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modeled as a non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) (Ascher and Feingold, 1984; 
Pievatolo and Ruggeri, 2004). 
Many studies have been conducted to develop statistical reliability models using 
historical failure data. Majority of studies in pipeline reliability relate to water supply 
network failures due to data availability (Røstum, 2000; Kleiner et al., 2001; Rajani and 
Kleiner, 2001). Hence, it is difficult to find in the published literature reliability analyses 
for natural gas pipeline systems. 
Although there is limited study for natural gas pipelines, majority of other studies 
are related to repairable systems such as power distribution systems or water distribution 
systems (Stillman, 2003; Rajani and Kleiner, 2001). One example was found for natural 
gas pipeline system. Caleyo et al. (2008) conducted a study to estimate the failure rate of 
a pipeline population from the historical failure data, which are pooled from multiple 
pipeline system in Southern Mexico. In the study, Caleyo et al. (2008) emphasized that 
the study was conducted on the basis of the statistical methods for reliability of 
repairable systems (Caleyo et al., 2008).  
Due to the limited sources for natural gas pipeline system reliability study, 
repairable system reliability process and analysis are used for natural gas transmission 
pipeline systems. The basic process of modeling corrosion failure rate for pipeline 
systems is discussed in details in the next subsection. 
2.3.1 Failure Function 
The actual failure characteristics of systems are generally based on the analysis 
of observed failure data. When data is obtained from the system, the parameters of life 
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distribution or reliability of the system can be determined. The estimations of the 
parameters of the life distribution are called parametric statistical methods (Nachlas, 
2005).  
The analysis of previous failure data is mentioned in many articles. Røstum 
(2000) emphasized that the most important factor to predict future failures in water 
supply network is previous failures. Further, the age is an important element to estimate 
the first failure on water supply network. Similarly, Kleiner and Rajani (2001) stated that 
the previous historical failures could be used to identify pipe breakage patterns. They 
assume that historical failure pattern will continue into the future. Therefore, probability 
of breakage can be estimated with statistical methods. Previous authors used statistical 
methods to predict failure rate of water main breaks by way of the past failures. 
Parametric statistical methods for analyzing reliability data require an assumption 
of the form of the life distribution. The choice of a distribution model depends on 
experience about similarity of the systems. With the estimation of the parameters, 
reasonable representation of the failure probabilities can be obtained (Nachlas, 2005). 
First, the basic parameters of parametric statistical estimation of failure rate are 
discussed. Failure rate can express reliability for repairable system (Mohitpour et al., 
2010). Also, Caleyo et al. (2008) use this fact in their study and they emphasize that the 
term of “failure rate” is used in the ROCOF. Hence, the reliability of pipeline network is 
represented by failure rate. N(t) denotes the number of failures in the intervals (0,t] in a 
pipeline system. The rate of occurrence of failure (ROCOF, μ(t)) and the failure intensity 
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(rate) function (λ(t))  of a point process are given in Equation 2.1 and Equation 2.2, 
respectively (Rigdon and Basu, 2000; Caleyo et al., 2008).  
𝜇(𝑡) =
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
(𝐸(𝑁(𝑡))) (2.1) 
𝜆(𝑡) = lim
∆(𝑡)→0
𝑃[𝑁(𝑡,𝑡+∆(𝑡)≥1]
∆(𝑡)
  (2.2) 
where E(N(t)) denotes the expected number of failures in the interval (0,t] in a pipeline 
system. 
Rigdon and Basu (2000) noted that the intensity function and the ROCOF are 
measures of the reliability of a repairable system. They proved that these two functions 
are equal, provided that simultaneous failures cannot occur. Caleyo et al. (2008) stated 
that this assumption is reasonable for pipeline systems, in which simultaneous failures 
occur with a probability very close to zero.  
If failure mechanisms do not depend on time, failure rate shows a constant failure 
rate. Therefore, failure mechanisms, which have a constant failure rate, can be modeled 
using a homogenous Poisson process (HPP) with constant failure rate (λ) (Caleyo et al., 
2008). On the other hand, if the systems deteriorate or improve their reliability with 
time, the failure rate of the system can be modeled using the nonhomogeneous Poisson 
process (NHPP) (Caleyo et al., 2008). The following subsection summarizes the 
previous research for the estimations of parameters of life distribution and parametric 
statistical methods for the failure rate. 
2.3.2 Parametric Estimation of the Failure Rate 
As mention previously, pipeline systems are defined as repairable system, which 
can be modeled with a stochastic process. Poisson distribution is one of the important 
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processes used in the modeling of repairable systems (Rigdon and Basu, 2000). Two 
types of stochastic point process are commonly used in modeling pipeline failures: the 
homogeneous Poisson process (HPP) and the nonhomogeneous Poisson process 
(NHPP). 
2.3.2.1 The Homogeneous Poisson Process 
The homogeneous Poisson process (HPP) is a Poisson process with an intensity 
function that is constant (Rigdon and Basu, 2000). The HPP is one of the simplest 
possible models for repairable system. However, it should be applied with caution 
because the HPP model cannot be used to model a system that deteriorate or improve 
over time. Therefore, only table and time-independent failures from Table 2.1 can model 
by a homogeneous Poisson process (HPP) with constant failure rate (λ) (Rigdon and 
Basu, 2000). The HPP is characterized by exponentially distributed times between 
failures. 
The pipeline system failures are assumed to be time truncated. Rigdon and Basu 
(2000) defined the terminology as when a system could be observed until a 
predetermined time t, the number of failures N(t) is a random variable. The 
predetermined time, t, is Tobs for the pipeline systems in this thesis. The meaning of Tobs 
is observation time of the pipeline system. Therefore, the total number of failure in the 
observation time is N(Tobs) (Bain and Engelhardt, 1980; Rigdon and Basu, 2000; Caleyo 
et al., 2008). 
Basically, the failure rate of the pipeline system can be predicted with Equation 
2.3 (Caleyo et al., 2008).  
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?̂? =
𝑁(𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑠)
𝐿𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑠
  (2.3) 
where N(Tobs) is the total number of failures in the observation time in observing pipeline 
system, Tobs is the observation time (year), and Lexposure is total length of the pipeline 
system (mile) that is observed. Pipeline conditions are assumed uniform throughout the 
line in the studied section. The failure rate of a pipeline has the unit of number of 
failures per year and per unit of length of the pipeline, 1/(mile-year) or “per mile year” 
(Caleyo et al., 2008).  
The statistical uncertainty of failure rate can be determined with a significance 
level α. The quantity 2λTobs has a chi-square distribution (χ2) with 2N(Tobs ) degrees of 
freedom for the HPP truncated at time Tobs. The Equation 2.4 shows the 100(1-α)% 
confidence interval for λ (Caleyo et al., 2008; Rigdon and Basu, 2000). 
𝜒1−𝛼 2⁄
2 (2𝑁(𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑠))
2𝐿𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑠
< 𝜆 <
𝜒𝛼 2⁄
2 (2𝑁(𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑠))
2𝐿𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑠
  (2.4) 
2.3.2.2 The Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP) 
As mentioned in the beginning of this subsection the minimal repair assumption 
leaded to the nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP). The NHPP plays an important 
role for improvement of failure analysis techniques for repairable systems (Coetzee, 
1997; Krivtsov, 2007). 
Continuous growth models, especially power law model, are suitable for the 
pipeline systems. As mentioned previously, point process models are divided into NHPP 
reliability growth models and alternative reliability growth models (Ascher and 
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Feingold, 1984). Power law model is defined under NHPP reliability growth models 
(Ascher and Feingold, 1984; Pievatolo and Ruggeri, 2004). 
The nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) is a Poisson process with an 
intensity function that is non-constant (Rigdon and Basu, 2000). The NHPP is similar to 
the HPP with the exception that the expected number of failures is the function of time 
(Moghaddam and Usher, 2011). The NHPP can be used to model the systems that 
deteriorate or improve over time. Hence, the NHPP can be used to model the failure 
process of repairable systems (Rigdon and Basu, 2000; Krivtsov, 2007). 
Coetzee (1997) discussed the selection criteria for implementation of the NHPP 
model. First, the NHPP is a suitable model whether there is a trend in the times between 
failures. Second, if the system can be defined as the “bad-as-old “, the NHPP can be 
selected for modeling data. Third, if the systems are defined as repairable systems, again 
the NHPP is a good choice for modeling data. Characteristic of the pipeline failures 
match up with these selection criteria. 
As discussed at the beginning of third subsection, the cumulative number of 
failures is indication used in the reliability analysis (Nachlas, 2005). In addition, the 
NHPP is characterized by the cumulative intensity function, Λ(t), which represents the 
expected cumulative number of failures as a function of operation time (Krivtsov, 2007). 
Krivtsov (2007) defined the cumulative intensity function as: Λ(𝑡) = ∫ 𝜆(𝑡)𝑑𝑡,
𝑡
0
 where 
λ(t) is known as ROCOF.  
The intensity of the NHPP can be determined with a number of different 
parametric models such as power law model, the linear model, and the log-linear model. 
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The power law model is most commonly used technique in the literature. In the next 
subsection, the power law model is discussed. 
2.3.2.2.1 Power Law Process  
Power law model is considered to represent the NHPP. In fact, the NHPP is 
commonly referred as the power law process. Rigdon and Basu (2000) explain this 
situation as special case of the NHPP, where ROCOF is proportional to the global time t 
raised to a power. Also, the power law model is sometimes referred as a Weibull 
process, since the intensity function has the same functional form as the hazard function 
of the Weibull distribution (Røstum, 2000). 
The power law process is a model when the intensity function has the form 
𝜆(𝑡) =
𝛽
𝜃
(
𝑡
𝜃
)
𝛽−1
, where β > 0 and θ > 0 (Rigdon and Basu, 2000; Caleyo et al., 2008).  
The functional form of the expected number of failures for the pipeline system 
and the intensity function of pipeline failures through time t are shown in Equations 2.5 
and 2.6 (Rigdon and Basu, 2000): 
𝐸[𝑁(𝑡)] = 𝛬(𝑡) = (𝑡 𝜃⁄ )𝛽  (2.5) 
𝜆(𝑡) =
𝛽
𝜃
(
𝑡
𝜃
)
𝛽−1
  (2.6) 
where θ>0 and β>0 are the scale (the characteristic life) and shape parameters of the 
failure intensity function, respectively.  
The estimator β affects how system deteriorates or improves over time and θ is a 
scaling follow (Stillman, 2003; Rigdon and Basu, 2000). If: 
• β  > 1, λ (t) is increasing, the failures tend to occur more frequently; if 
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• β  < 1, λ (t) is decreasing, and the failures are less frequent; and if 
• β  = 1, the power law process reduces to a HPP, with intensity = 1/θ. 
As noted before, the time truncated case can be used for the pipeline failure data 
at Tobs. Let T1<T2<…<TN<Tobs denote the observed failure times before time Tobs. If the 
failure data is assumed that at least one failure occurs before time Tobs, the maximum 
likelihood estimators exist and are equal to (Rigdon and Basu, 2000): 
𝜃 =
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑠
𝑁(𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑠)
1 𝛽⁄   (2.7) 
?̂? =
𝑁(𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑠)
∑ log(𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑠 𝑡𝑖)⁄
𝑁(𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑠)
𝑖=1
  (2.8) 
where ti is the time of the ith failure and N(Tobs) is the total number of failures in the 
observation time in observing pipeline system. 
Based on the maximum likelihood estimations, the intensity function of the 
failure process can be estimated with Equation 2.9.  
?̂?(𝑡) =
?̂?
𝐿𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒?̂??̂?
𝑡?̂?−1  (2.9) 
The statistical uncertainty of β can be determined with a significance level α. The 
quantity 2𝑁(𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑠) 𝛽 ?̂?⁄  has a chi-square distribution (χ
2) with 2N(Tobs ) degrees of 
freedom for a power law process truncated at time Tobs. The Equation 2.10 shows the 
100(1-α)% confidence interval for β (Caleyo et al., 2008; Rigdon and Basu, 2000). 
𝜒1−𝛼 2⁄
2 (2𝑁(𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑠))?̂?
2𝑁(𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑠)
< 𝛽 <
𝜒𝛼 2⁄
2 (2𝑁(𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑠))?̂?
2𝑁(𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑠)
  (2.10) 
Caleyo et al. (2008) state that there is not any method to determine the exact 
confidence intervals for θ when the data are time truncated. Rigdon and Basu (2000) 
37 
 
emphasized that confidence intervals for θ are usually not computed when the data are 
time truncated. 
It is important to note that, it is often to test H0: β=1 versus H1: β≠1 as the power 
law process reduces to the homogeneous Poisson process when β=1 (Rigdon and Basu, 
2000). In other words, the null hypothesis is: the best model is a HPP, while the 
alternative is: the power law process is the best. The rule is to reject H0 if (Rigdon and 
Basu, 2000; Caleyo et al., 2008). 
𝜒𝛼/2
2
(2𝑁(𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑠)
)
<
2𝑁(𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑠)
?̂?
 or 
2𝑁(𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑠)
?̂?
 > 𝜒1−𝛼/2
2
(2𝑁(𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑠)
)
 (2.11) 
2.4 Preventive Maintenance Methods 
As mentioned in the first subsection, pipeline operators try to avoid pipeline 
failures because it may lead to significant injuries and fatalities, environmental issues, 
product loss, and property damages. Not only the nature of the failure events but also the 
frequency of failures are very important for the safety. These results force the companies 
to avoid pipeline failures and to use their available funds more effectively for preventive 
maintenance actions. At that point, developing an optimum corrosion prevention strategy 
plays a key role to extend the useful life, to improve the system reliability, and to reduce 
the rate of occurrence of failures of transmission pipelines (Nachlas, 2005). 
Maintenance helps the operators to use the resources more efficiently. Although 
the pipelines are designed, conducted, and operated correctly, deterioration occurs on the 
line internally or externally, directly or indirectly (Mohitpour et al., 2010). Therefore, 
routine maintenance activities are crucial to keep the pipeline operation safe (Mohitpour 
et al., 2010). Maintenance policies help decrease the unexpected failures and reduce 
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OPEX. For example, Baker Jr. (2008) emphasized that, although the failure pattern was 
consistent over time, the pattern was not affected by the aging of the infrastructure 
(Baker Jr., 2008). Due to the this reason, Baker Jr. (2008) did not observe any significant 
increase for pipeline failure from 1988 to 2008, due to the effectiveness of the industry 
efforts to control corrosion (Baker Jr., 2008). Moreover, the pipeline system reliability 
can be maximized and failure costs can be minimized with proper maintenance decisions 
(Wang, 2002).  
Maintenance can be defined as actions to: 1) control the system’s deterioration 
process which leads to failure and 2) restore the system to its operational state, through 
corrective actions after a failure (Blischke and Murthy, 2000). Under the same scope of 
maintenance, Mohitpour et al. (2010) define the pipeline system maintenance objectives 
is as “The primary purpose of any pipeline maintenance program is to maximize 
throughput and prolong the life of a pipeline system while ensuring public safety and 
respecting the environment” (Røstum, 2000; Thompson, 2004; Mohitpour et al., 2010). 
Reliability and maintenance are closely related to each other. Nachlas (2005) 
defined reliability as: “Reliability is the probability that a device properly performs its 
intended function over time when operated within the environment for which it is 
designed.” It follows from here that the equipment or the device can be operated 
correctly within design limits by maintenance (Mohitpour et al., 2010). Due to above 
definition, the first step of the optimal maintenance policy is to determine system 
reliability (Wang and Pham, 2006).  
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Maintenance actions can be divided into two major classes: preventive 
maintenance and corrective maintenance (Wang, 2002). Preventive maintenance (PM) is 
a broad term that involves a set of activities to improve the overall system reliability. 
These activities are planned activities such as monitoring, cleaning, CP, testing, 
patrolling, training, repair, and replacement (Nachlas, 2005). For all types of systems, 
the manufacturer or operators prescribe maintenance schedules to reduce the risk of 
system failure (Moghaddam and Usher, 2011). Mohitpour et al. (2010) summarize 
required performance and time by code requirement for routine maintenance activities in 
Table 2.2 for corrosion type failures. For example, cathodically protected pipeline 
systems must be controlled annually, and the interval between two-inspections cannot 
exceed 15 months (Baker Jr., 2008). Corrective maintenance (CM) or emergency repair 
(ER), on the other hand, implies emergency response (unscheduled) that is performed as 
a result of the failure like a rupture or a leak (Wang, 2002). Corrective maintenance 
involves often replacement or repair to a section of a pipeline to restore the system from 
a failed state to a specified condition (Mohitpour et al., 2010). 
Previous studies shows that a significant number of maintenance actions are 
performed as corrective maintenance in pipeline systems (Røstum, 2000; Thompson, 
2004; Baker Jr., 2008). The meaning of the CM is that failures occur before measures 
are taken.  
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Table 2.2 Routine Maintenance Schedules of Major Pipeline Elements (Mohitpour et al., 
2010) 
Maintenance Activity 
Maintenance Schedule or 
Frequency 
Requirement or Remarks 
CP monitoring 
Annual, not to exceed 15 
months 
ASME B31.1 (1999) 
Internal Corrosion 
Monitoring 
<6 months 
ASME 31.4 (1998): if line 
internally coated, pigged, 
dehydrated/corrosion inhibition, 
corrosion coupon used 
Exposed pipe: External 
monitoring 
<3 years 
ASME B31.4 (1998) 
On the other hand, preventive maintenance determines the maintenance 
requirements by providing systematic inspection, detection and prevention of incipient 
failures (Wang, 2002). Preventive maintenance requires a good knowledge of the 
pipeline characteristics, including whole variables that affect pipeline performance 
(Mohitpour et al., 2010; Røstum, 2000).  
As previously discussed, the main purpose of maintenance actions is to improve 
the system reliability and to prevent the probability of system failure (Wang and Pham, 
2006). However, there are varieties of possible applications of PM policies (Nachlas, 
2005). Therefore, in the last several decades, a number of different preventive 
maintenance optimization models have been proposed to establish the optimal 
maintenance policies. Barlow and Hunter (1960), Nakagawa (1981), Nakagawa (1986), 
Valdez-Flores and Feldman (1989), Wang (2002), and Wang and Pham (2006) survey 
and summarize the research and practice in reliability, maintenance, replacement, and 
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inspection in different ways. It is important to note that, discussing all maintenance 
models are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, general information and a few 
models are discussed in this thesis.  
As discussed in the third subsection, the system operating condition can be 
classified according to how the system is affected by maintenance, and then five repair 
(maintenance) actions are discussed. For instance, in some cases, maintenance involves 
the replacement of a component of the system before to failure. In contrast, maintenance 
actions sometimes consist of simple inspection and testing (Nachlas, 2005). Due to these 
reasons, each of the maintenance policies depends on maintenance costs and/or different 
maintenance restoration degrees (minimal, imperfect, perfect) (Wang, 2002). 
In the literature, there are two main replacement-types of preventive maintenance 
policies: age replacement and block replacement policies (Nachlas, 2005).  
Age replacement policy means that the system is replaced when the system 
achieves an age equal to the policy age. The earliest age replacement policy considers 
that the system is replaced by a new one after each preventive maintenance or ER. The 
policy considers renewal theory-based models for system performance. Therefore, 
systems are repaired to the “good-as-new” condition at each repair action due to renewal 
model assumptions. However, maintenance practice showed that a system or equipment 
continues to deteriorate even when the system or equipment was renewed. Although PM 
reduces failure probability, it does not restore the system operation condition to a “good 
as new” state. Therefore, renewal models are not suitable for many real systems 
(Coetzee, 1997; Gertsbakh, 2000; Nachlas, 2005).  
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As an alternative to renewal process, minimal repair models are proposed. The 
earliest minimal repair models were suggested by Barlow and Hunter (1960) (Nachlas, 
2005). This model assumes that the system failure rate is not disturbed by any minimal 
repair of failures and the system is replaced at predetermined times (Nguyen and 
Murthy, 1981). In other words, the minimal repair eliminates the failure but leaves the 
failure rate unchanged (Gertsbakh, 2000; Nachlas, 2005). For pipeline systems, the 
failure rate increases with age; therefore, operation of the system would become 
increasingly expensive to maintain by minimal repairs. Thus, the main problem of the 
minimal repair models is when replacement actions are optimal instead of performing 
minimal repair (Valdez‐ Flores and Feldman, 1989).  
Minimal repair models generally assume that 1) the failure rate function of the 
system increase, 2) minimal repairs do not affect the system’s failure rate, 3) the cost of 
a minimal repair is less than the cost of replacing, and 4) system failures are detected 
immediately (Valdez‐ Flores and Feldman, 1989). 
With the concepts of minimal repair and imperfect maintenance, these models 
were improved. These new established models are referred to as the age-dependent PM 
policy. This policy assumes that a system is preventively maintained at some 
predetermined age, or repaired at failure until a perfect maintenance is received (Wang, 
2002). Wang (2002) noted that PM at the predetermined age and CM at each failure 
might be minimal, imperfect, or perfect. Therefore, many maintenance models are 
developed based on different types of PM (minimal, imperfect, perfect), CM (minimal, 
imperfect, perfect), cost structures, etc. (Wang, 2002). On the contrary, if a system is 
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repaired with only minimal repair at failure, the age replacement policy reduces to “the 
periodic replacement with minimal repair at failure” policy (Wang, 2002). 
Periodic (block) replacement policy is based on scheduled actions rather than on 
the system age. As is the case with age replacement policy, the earliest studies consider 
that the system is replaced by a new one after each preventive maintenance or ER. 
However, with the concepts of minimal repair and imperfect maintenance, another PM 
periodic policy is established. This model is called “periodic replacement with minimal 
repair at failure” policy in which a system is replaced at predetermined times and 
failures are removed by minimal repair (Wang, 2002). Also, this policy was introduced 
firstly by Barlow and Hunter (1960) as policy II.  
Many extensions and variations are proposed for periodic replacement with 
minimal repair at failure policy. Nakagawa (1981) studies four models of modified 
periodic replacement with minimal repair at failures. The first three models study a 
failure that occurs just before the replacement time is specified. The last model considers 
failure, which occurs well before replacement time. The last model suggests that the 
system is replaced at failure or at time, whichever occurs first. All models obtain the 
optimum T0*,T* to minimize the cost rates, when T is the replacement time which 
minimizes the expected cost rate for the basic replacement model. If 0<T0*<T and T* >T, 
exists, then the models have a lower cost rate (Nakagawa, 1981; Wang, 2002). 
Costs of PM can be optimized based on an optimal maintenance cost models. 
The cost models for these PM policies can be formulated without considering the 
maintenance time. Basically, the preventive maintenance costs can be divided into three: 
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failure costs, maintenance costs, and replacement costs. The final cost of the preventive 
maintenance is a function of the all the actions taken in the life cycle of the system 
(Moghaddam and Usher, 2011). Therefore, the total cost per unit time is an informative 
measure of system performance (Nachlas, 2005). 
The preventive maintenance costs can be divided into three: failure costs, 
maintenance costs, and replacement costs. The final cost of the preventive maintenance 
is a function of the all the actions taken in the life cycle of the system (Moghaddam and 
Usher, 2011). 
There are many approaches to determining the optimal maintenance policy. 
Under the scope of this thesis, selected approach for cost model considers the 
maintenance interval, which minimizes the total expected cost per unit time for the 
system. The cost per unit has to take into account both costs associated with failures, and 
costs of the PM (replacement). The optimization problem can be pictured as shown in 
Figure 2.5. It can be observed on Figure 2.5 that with low level of PM action, the PM 
cost is low but the expected CM costs are high. With increasing PM action, the CM cost 
decreases and the PM cost increases as shown in Figure 2.5. Moreover, the total cost that 
includes PM and CM decreases initially and then increases with increasing PM action. 
Therefore, there is an optimum level of PM effort that can minimize the total costs of 
maintenance (Damnjanovic, 2006; Louit et al., 2009; Blischke and Murthy, 2000). 
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Figure 2.5 Optimal PM Intervals for Costs Minimization 
 The optimal maintenance interval can be solved with a fixed interval. Therefore, 
the fixed interval problem will be solved with the block replacement policy. The 
advantage of the fixed interval policy is easy practical implementation (Louit et al., 
2009). 
 The cost models for the block replacement policy are formulated without 
considering the durations of the maintenance exercises. As mentioned previously, the 
costs represent the implications of failure and of planned replacement. Hence, the total 
cost per unit time is an informative measure of system performance (Nachlas, 2005). In 
the view of such information, a model for the total cost per unit time for a block 
replacement PM strategy is described in Equation 2.12 (Louit et al., 2009; Nachlas, 
2005).  
𝐶(𝑇) =
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝐸(𝑁(𝑇))+𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑇
 (2.12) 
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where, C(T) is the expected cost per unit time given a PM interval equal to T, E(N(T)) is 
the expected number of failures in [0,T], Creplacement is the average cost of system 
replacement, and Crepair is the average cost of repair of a failure through minimal repair.  
Louit et al. (2009) suggested that E(N(T)) should be estimated for different 
failure modes separately such as internal corrosion and external corrosion. Therefore, 
Equation 2.12 is modified for incorporating multiple failure modes that is given in 
Equation 2.13 (Louit et al., 2009).  
𝐶(𝑇) =
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 ∑ 𝐸(𝑁𝑖(𝑇))
𝑚
𝑖=1 +𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑇
 (2.13) 
where, E(Ni(T)) is the expected number of failures for failure mode i, i=1,2,…,m.  
The intensity of failures per unit time can be estimated with Equation 2.6 for 
particular types of corrosion failures. From the intensity function 𝜆𝑖(𝑡), the expected 
number of failures E(Ni(T)) can be estimated for each failure mode. This calculation is 
given in Equation 2.14 (Coetzee, 1997; Gertsbakh, 2000; Louit et al., 2009): 
𝐸(𝑁𝑖(𝑇)) = ∫ 𝜆𝑖(𝑇)
𝑇
0
𝑑𝑡 (2.14) 
This equation will give the cumulative number of failures in [0,T] for each type of 
corrosion failures. 
2.5 Pipeline Protection and Corrosion Control Methods 
Operators are rethinking and developing new maintenance strategies that may 
improve business outcomes (Mohitpour et al., 2010). Estimation of future pipeline 
failure rate is critical for developing the budgets for rehabilitation and replacement needs 
(Røstum, 2000). Therefore, the operators would like to apply the best maintenance 
strategy, which will give the most effective results (Mohitpour et al., 2010). 
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As discussed in the fourth subsection, the purpose of the maintenance is to 
minimize the overall costs of the system operation and to maximize the system reliability 
(Moghaddam and Usher, 2011). The overall costs include the failure costs (production 
cost), maintenance costs, and replacement costs. Another part of the maintenance is to 
make proper decision for replacement for the end of the life cycle of equipment and 
facilities.  
Full replacement is not a cost-effective choice for pipeline operators after each 
occurrence of failure. As mentioned previously, pipeline systems are linear structures, 
and each failure affects only one small section of the entire system. Thus, the most 
appropriate approach is to repair the pipes until the failure costs clearly outweigh the 
replacement cost, or until new pipeline projects make replacement economically 
attractive (Røstum, 2000). 
Thompson (2004) and Mohitpour et al. (2010) suggested replacement criteria, if 
the following conditions occur: 
 Severe corrosion damage of a pipeline is not properly cathodically protected; 
 Stress corrosion cracking is through a large area of pipeline; 
 Performance is inadequate for current requirements; 
 Reliability reduces below acceptable levels; 
 Maintenance and technical support is no longer available; 
 The increasing cost of operation and maintenance justifies replacement by 
similar or more suitable equipment. 
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Rehabilitation or replacement decisions should be properly timed. According to 
the case studies of replacement/rehabilitation policies by Thompson (2004), the average 
rehabilitation cost of the existing line is estimated to be approximately 60 percent of the 
replacement cost in 1996. Also, in the same study, rehabilitation cost to be estimated 40 
percent to 80 percent of the new pipeline construction cost (Thompson, 2004). This 
study shows that early replacement decision can lead to large financial losses. 
Moreover, to make a proper maintenance decision, the variables that affect the 
maintenance decisions must be analyzed well. The costs of maintenance are one of the 
crucial variables. The corrosion costs can be divided into two parts: direct and indirect. 
Direct cost includes annual test point cathodic protection surveys, maintenance coating 
operations, training, pipe inspection at excavations point, rectifier readings (monthly), 
casing and insulator inspection, CP maintenance and upgrades (including materials), 
record-keeping, and close interval survey (Kermani and Harrop, 2008; Thompson, 
2004). The indirect cost, on the other hand, is related to third party activities. The 
indirect cost has a more complex structure because it is related to several factors like 
damages to the environment, disruption to the public, injury or fatality (judicial process), 
permits, property damages, and lost revenue because of pipelines being out of service 
due to ruptures (Thompson, 2004; Kermani and Harrop, 2008).  
The pipelines must operate in design and operation requirements until the final 
decision of replacement time. Therefore, routine maintenance activities are crucial to 
keep the pipeline in operation requirements. Several pipeline protection and control 
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methods have been established. It is important to note that each mitigation strategies 
depend on the individually threats which are given at Table 2.1.  
As discussed in the second subsection, corrosion failures are considered in the 
scope of this study. Mitigating strategies are different for each type of corrosion mode. 
For instance, external corrosion preventing strategies are not a feasible option for 
internal corrosion. More specifically, internal corrosion treatment requires cutting out 
and replacing the sections of the pipeline that is affected. In contrast, cathodic protection 
and re-coating may protect the pipe from external corrosion factors (Thompson, 2004). 
In the next subsection, corrosion preventing and mitigation maintenance methods 
are discussed for corrosion failure modes.  
2.5.1 Pipeline Protection and Corrosion Control Methods for External Corrosion 
External corrosion is a chemical or electrochemical phenomenon that occurs due 
to a reaction between the pipeline surface and the pipeline environment. Therefore, 
external corrosion can be controlled by altering the electrochemical condition field 
around the pipeline or disconnecting interface of pipeline from its environment. There 
are two main mitigation strategies for external corrosion: coating and cathodic protection 
(CP) (Thompson, 2004; Baker Jr., 2008; Mora‐ Mendoza et al., 2011). 
Cathodic Protection (CP) is used for control of the corrosion of a metal surface 
by making it the cathode of an electrochemical cell (Peabody, 2001). For buried 
pipelines, if voltage around the pipe can be altered by CP technique, the rate of corrosion 
can be controlled. CP is needed only on the minute areas of pipes’ surface that exposed 
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its environment at local damage of the external coatings (holidays) rather than all 
pipelines’ surface of an uncoated pipe (Mohitpour et al., 2010). 
Coating is another technique used to prevent external corrosion. There are 
different coating techniques such as Fusion Bond Epoxy (FBE), bituminous enamels, 
asphalt mastic pipe, cold applied tapes, wax coatings, fused tapes, and three-layer 
polyolefin (Thompson, 2004). 
However, pipeline surface cannot be protected fully by coating because it is 
impossible to produce a perfect line of coating. There are always coating flaws 
(holidays), there are due to the construction damage, inappropriate application, natural 
phenomenon, completed life cycle of coating, or soil stresses (Baker Jr., 2008; 
Thompson, 2004). When the coat has holidays, pipeline systems need more CP 
(Thompson, 2004). With poor coating, corrosion process can occur on the pipeline 
surface, even though appropriate CP levels are applied. Moreover, protecting bare 
pipeline with CP throughout pipes’ length is not a cost effective method. Therefore, CP 
and external coating techniques are used together whenever possible to mitigate external 
corrosion (Thompson, 2004). The purpose of the coating is to reduce the amount of 
required protection area of the pipe as much as possible (Ireland and Lopez, 2000; 
Thompson, 2004; Beavers and Thompson, 2006; Baker Jr., 2008; Mora‐ Mendoza et al., 
2011). 
Older pipelines, installed before 1950s, might have many unprotected pipeline 
segments resulting in corrosion problems. Although major pipeline operators started to 
coat their line in the 1950s, they did not provide CP until it became a requirement to do 
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so (Baker Jr., 2008). Following 49 CFR Part 192, the oil and gas industry has been 
familiar with mitigation and corrosion prevention (Thompson, 2004).  
One of the important questions for developing external corrosion plan is 
determining the frequency of pipe coating. Coating deterioration starts when pipeline 
reaches to the end of the effective life cycle of coating. Because of this reason, CP and 
external coating techniques are used together whenever possible is. Deterioration of 
coating affects the success and cost of CP, directly. For this reason, the best way to 
extend pipeline operation-life is pipeline coating rehabilitation (recoating of the line). 
According to the Ireland and Lopez (2000), recoating saved 40 percent of cost versus 
replacement of coating (Thompson, 2004; Baker Jr., 2008; Ireland and Lopez, 2000). 
2.5.2 Pipeline Protection and Corrosion Control Methods for Internal Corrosion 
Internal corrosion is an electrochemical process. However, mitigating strategies 
are different than from external corrosion. For example, CP is not a feasible option for 
mitigating the efforts of internal corrosion. However, there are other mitigating the 
efforts of internal corrosion strategies such as dehydration, chemical treatment, periodic 
cleaning, and internal coating.  
The most common method of preventing internal corrosion is dehydration 
(dewatering). Moisture-free gas (dry gas) does not cause corrosion because there is not 
any corrosive material in the gas (Thompson, 2004). Therefore, the pipeline operators 
need to control the amount of corrosive fluids such as moisture, oxygen, and CO2 
contents. In the natural gas pipeline, dehydration control is done through separation 
facilities. The purpose of the separation facilities is to remove the undesirable 
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components from the gas before pumping the gas to the transmission pipelines. 
However, those components can reenter the pipelines by way of compressor stations, 
metering stations, valves, control stations and SCADA systems, or storage facilities 
(Thompson, 2004; Hacioglu, 2012). 
The other option for preventing internal corrosion is chemical treatment 
(inhibitors and biocides). Chemical inhibitors are injected into the gas being transported 
to reduce the corrosion to an acceptable rate.  Also, biocides are used to prevent 
microbiological activity. The chemical treatments are expensive prevention strategies 
because chemical treatment requires monitoring of the inhibitor additive and continuous 
injection of inhibitors or biocides (Thompson, 2004; Hacioglu, 2012).  
Periodic cleaning of the line with smart pigs is another mitigating strategy. There 
are different kinds of pigs that are used for different purposes. During the cleaning 
operation, the pigs scrape the line and apply cleaning solution such as solvents, biocides, 
acids, and detergents when it passes through the line. The pigs remove the operation of 
debris from the line before leaving (Thompson, 2004).  
The operators do not prefer internal coating, because the line must be 
disconnected from the service during the coating process. This result is loss of profit due 
to shutdown, so they prefer other mitigation and preventing methods for internal 
corrosion (Thompson, 2004). 
As a summary, this section presents the literature review relevant to the overall 
objectives of the thesis and introduces the necessary background to analyze system 
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reliability and optimal maintenance actions for pipeline systems. In the following 
section, the methodological framework of this thesis is formulated and discussed.
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3. THE OVERALL METHODOLOGY 
 
The next step of this thesis is to develop a mathematical representation of the 
pipeline system, its failures, and develop a model for determining optimal maintenance 
action. Figure 3.1 shows a schematic diagram of the research framework used for the 
reliability modeling and preventive maintenance strategies. The research framework 
involves six steps. First, the raw incident data is collected from PHMSA data sources. 
The data is then classified according to pipeline attributes such as diameter, installation 
year (service age), wall thickness, amount of property damage, cause of incidents, etc. 
Second, the failure intensity function is formulated based on whether the failure data is 
fit the homogeneous Poisson process (HPP) or non-homogeneous Poisson process 
(NHPP) (power law process). Third, the HPP is tested against the power law process for 
corrosion failure modes. The null hypothesis is H0: β=1 versus H1: β≠1. Fourth, based on 
the null hypothesis results, a proper stochastic model is selected. If the system is suitable 
for NHPP, the power law parameters and their confidence intervals are estimated. If the 
HPP is suitable, the generic (constant) failure rate and the confidence intervals are 
evaluated. Fifth, the expected number of failures and the intensity functions of the failure 
are estimated for any time point and their confidence intervals are estimated with results 
of selected statistical models. Finally, the models for determining an optimal preventive 
maintenance schedule are developed based underlying point process. The following 
subsections present the details of the methodology framework and assumptions. 
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3.1 System Characterization  
Pipeline systems refer to a group of natural gas pipelines. PHMSA does not 
provide detailed information about each line’s length. PHMSA just provides total miles 
of pipe for each company by nominal size and decade of installation, so pipelines should 
be considered as a network instead of single line. Due to the above reason, pipeline 
systems are modeled as a network by a point stochastic process (Caleyo et al., 2008). 
Success of the statistical models depends on the quality of the data. As discussed 
in Section 2, pipeline failures depend upon various factors such as maintenance types, 
maintenance time, pressure, diameter, employees’ training level, environmental 
conditions, etc. It is very difficult to include these variables into reliability models. Also, 
failure data cannot be collected under similar conditions because lines in the same 
networks have different materials, soil conditions, construction techniques, installation 
years, and design requirements. Due to this reason, environmental variations and 
operational variations are assumed as uniform throughout the whole pipeline systems 
(Røstum, 2000). Moreover, due to the Code of Federal Regulations (49 CFR Parts 191, 
195) and the effectiveness of the industry efforts to control corrosion, it is assumed that 
the pipelines are internally and externally protected by proper methods. 
As noted in literature review, there are more than 1,000 natural gas pipeline 
operators. Working with all the companies’ data requires time and more analysis. This 
study considers only the largest eleven natural gas operators’ failure data that were 
chosen for this thesis. These companies hold almost 33 percent of natural gas pipeline 
networks in the United States. 
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The development of reliability models requires previous number of failure 
recorded. This research uses the historical failure data set include incidents from 2001 to 
2011 and is used estimate the expected number of failures for the networks. In the 
Section 4, more detailed information about the selection criteria of the time interval are 
provided and discussed. 
The expected number of failures of the system includes the unit of the number of 
failures per year and per unit length of the pipe. 
3.2 Modeling Failures 
The scope of this thesis is the developed statistical models for reliability of 
repairable systems. First, failure characteristics of natural gas pipeline system are 
defined. As noted in the literature review, the natural gas pipeline failure mechanisms 
have been classified under 22 root causes. Corrosion failures are considered in this study 
because corrosion failures rate are not a constant rate. In other words, corrosion failures 
deteriorate or improve over time. Therefore, statistical models require describing failures 
mode on wear-out phase for corrosion. 
Characterization of failure, which depends on probability distribution of the 
number of failures, is the most important step of good predictions. The first step of 
characterization is to calculate failure rate for a taken time interval. Basically, failure rate 
can be figured out with a nonparametric estimate of the failure rate equation. Each 
statistical data has different distributions, as in the pipelines failures. After figuring out 
the failure rate, proper distribution fitting methods should be selected to fit probability 
distribution.  
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There are several probability distributions for modeling reliability as discussed in 
Section 2. Selecting the most appropriate methods of fitting of a probability distribution 
requires having good statistical knowledge. One of the distributions can fit better into 
probability distribution than others. Selections of the methods depend on the 
characteristics of the dataset.  
The pipeline systems deteriorate or improve the reliability of the system over 
time. Also, the systems are defined as repairable systems and failure data has trend. 
Pipeline system, after the repair process, is defined as bad-as-old. This assumption 
causes reliability of repairable systems to be modeled as a non-homogeneous Poisson 
process (NHPP), mainly the Power Law process (Ascher and Feingold, 1984; Pievatolo 
and Ruggeri, 2004). 
There is no statistical software available for handling the NHPP. Therefore, 
MATLAB® was chosen for solving these NHPP’ equations and the shape parameters of 
power law process under the scope of this thesis. 
3.3 Optimal Preventive Maintenance Methods 
The pipeline operators are seeking not only the expected number of failures, but 
also an optimal solution to minimize potential failures in the future operation. As noted 
in the literature review, predictive models can be used to improve maintenance 
decisions. Therefore, the expected number of failure is a step towards a preventive 
maintenance. As noted in the literature review, there are number of corrosion mitigation 
strategies to prevent the lines. Although, these methods are used by majority of pipeline 
operators, the pipeline systems continue to deteriorate. Therefore, the rehabilitation and 
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renovation plan should be prepared for each line. Optimization preventive maintenance 
involves these plans for future pipeline operation.  
Optimization preventive maintenance refers to combining many situations and 
systems, then selecting the best solution from all feasible results. The usual selection 
criteria are based on maintenance cost measures such as expected maintenance cost per 
unit of time, total discounted costs, gain, etc. (Wang and Pham, 2006). First, proper 
maintenance policy is chosen for a repairable and maintainable system. There are 
number of optimal maintenance policies which depend on system characteristic. The 
pipeline systems consider to be repairable system with minimal repairs only. Therefore, 
the periodic replacement with minimal repair at failure policy is adopted in this study. 
Second, the selected maintenance policy needs cost data that is related to 
maintenance and replacement cost to find optimal solution. The pipeline systems are 
complex systems and there is a limited source to find current costs information. 
Therefore, average costs are taken for related costs information. 
As noted in in the literature review, the purpose of the maintenance is to 
minimize the overall operation costs and to maximize the system reliability. The optimal 
maintenance decision is an optimum level of PM effort that can minimize the total cost 
of maintenance. This decision can be developed with proper cost models. Finally, based 
on optimal maintenance policy, cost models are developed to find optimal maintenance 
time and minimum maintenance cost.
59 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Schematic Diagram of Thesis Methodology 
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4. DATA SETS DEVELOPMENT 
 
The next step of this thesis is to prepare data sets for the reliability modeling. 
Figure 4.1 shows the data set used in the thesis. Two major data sets are used in this 
thesis. Data set 1 is required for getting the total miles information for each operator, and 
data set 2 is required for analyzing incidents data. In the following subsections, details 
about the two main data sets are provided. 
4.1 Data Set 1- Distribution, Transmission, and Liquid Annual Data 
Due to the Code of Federal Regulations (49 CFR 191.15), written incidents 
reports are required for gas transmission and gathering systems by the natural gas 
operators. These data is collected by PHMSA. Government agencies, the industry 
professionals, researchers, and PHMSA generally use these annual reports for purpose of 
safety, inspection planning, and risk assessment. This database is called Distribution, 
Transmission, and Liquid Annual Data, and can be downloaded from PHMSA website 
(PHMSA, 2013c). The data that is downloaded on July 31, 2012 is used in this thesis. 
An example of the data set is shown in Table 4.1. The annual reports contain general 
information such as pipeline operators’ information, total pipeline mileage, miles by 
material of pipeline, miles by diameter, and decade of installation from 1970 (PHMSA, 
2013c). 
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Table 4.1 Example of Annual Report of Distribution, Transmission, and Liquid Annual 
Data 
Report Year: 2008 Operator ID 
 The miles of 
transmission 
ONSHORE 
lines in the 
system at end 
of year, by 
diameter 
The miles of 
transmission 
OFFSHORE 
lines in the 
system at end 
of year, by 
diameter 
The miles of 
transmission 
ONSHORE 
lines in the 
system at end 
of year, by 
decade of 
installation 
The miles of 
transmission 
OFFSHORE 
lines in the 
system at end 
of year, by 
decade of 
installation 
Unknown 0 0   
4 in or less 104 0   
> 4 in and ≤10 in 519 45   
>10 in and ≤20 in 2255 22   
>20 in and ≤28 in 1634 0   
> 28 in 891 0   
Unknown   0 0 
Pre 1940   22 0 
1940 - 1949   251 0 
1950 - 1959   968 0 
1960 - 1969   569 40 
1970 - 1979   931 27 
1980 - 1989   420 0 
1990 - 1999   578 0 
2000 – 2009    1664 0 
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4.2 Data Set 2- Significant Incident Data Reports 
U.S. Department of Transportation-Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (PHMSA) provides also historical incident statistics that has been 
collected from American pipeline operators since 1986. The database involves different 
type of pipelines information such as gathering, distribution, and transmission pipeline 
incidents and different category of incidents such as serious and significant. Within the 
scope of this study, only significant incident data are considered. A significant pipeline 
incident is identified by PHMSA when any of the following conditions occur (PHMSA, 
2013d):   
1. Fatality or injury requiring in-patient hospitalization, 
2. $50,000 or more in total costs, measured in 1984 dollars, 
3. Highly volatile liquid releases of 5 barrels or more or other liquid releases of 50 
barrels or more, 
4. Liquid releases resulting in an unintentional fire or explosion. 
The significant incident data’ reports are generated from various data sources 
maintained for Pipeline Safety Regulation. PHMSA shares the database to the public to 
raise awareness of pipeline safety. This database involves significant pipeline incidents 
information for onshore and offshore pipelines such as the pipeline operators 
information, failure causes, total dollar amount of property damages, installation year of 
line, maximum pressure and pressure on failure time, depth of cover, local date and time 
of failure, the pipe diameter, wall thinness of pipe, the pipe materials, coating 
information, CP information, release type, and fatally or injury information. The raw 
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incident data can be downloaded from PHMSA website (PHMSA, 2013d).  The database 
was divided into three time periods that are 1986-2001, 2002-2009, and 2010-present. 
2,625 significant pipeline incidents have been reported in the U.S. since 1986. The costs 
associated with incidents are also provided in 2012 dollars in the datasets (PHMSA, 
2013d). 
4.3 Preparation of Final Data Set 
The PHMSA databases were collected from a wide range of sources that covered 
all types of pipelines (e.g. gathering, transmission, and distribution) and all failures 
causes. Therefore, there are many number of variables that are related to incidents and 
the pipeline operators in the PHMSA’ datasets. However, the study does not need all the 
information in datasets. Therefore, the datasets were cropped carefully based on operator 
ID number. Appendix A, Appendix B, and Appendix E illustrate more details of dataset.  
As noted in previously, natural gas transmission pipelines incident data were 
considered. These incident data can be divided into subsections such as, failure 
characteristics and groups of pipes with the same decade of installation. Røstum (2000) 
implied that, each installation decade of pipeline has had different construction practices 
and with technologies that are no longer appropriate. Therefore, pipelines have different 
failure characteristics depending on installation decade. 
Due to above reason, time interval (the decades of installation) is divided into 
eight groups based on the decade of installation in DOT/PHMSA distribution, 
transmission, and liquid annual data. Table 4.2 shows decades of installation of the 
dataset. 
64 
 
Table 4.2 Decade of Installation of Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines in the U.S in 
DOT/PHMSA Distribution, Transmission, and Liquid Annual Data 
Decade of installation of the transmission pipeline networks 
Pre 
1940 
1940-
1949 
1950-
1959 
1960-
1969 
1970-
1979 
1980-
1989 
1990-
1999 
2000-
2009 
Second, DOT/PHMSA distribution, transmission, and liquid annual data set are 
examined from 2001 to 2011.Before 2001 only a few companies sent their information 
properly to DOT/PHMSA for the scope of Code of Federal Regulations. Another 
problem is that, there is not any information about the decade of installation before 2001. 
In summary, the data sources were carefully prioritized based on type of failure 
caused by corrosion. Pipeline reliability models are established for corrosion failure. 98 
internal corrosion failures were recorded from 2001 to 2011. In same time interval, 46 
external corrosion failures were recorded.
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Figure 4.1 Data Processing for Reliability Analysis
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5. RELIABILITY MODELS FOR NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION PIPELINES 
 
This section presents development of reliability models for the estimation of 
failure rate of pipeline networks. In the first subsection, reliability models are formulated 
for internal corrosion mode. In the second subsection, reliability models are formulated 
for external corrosion. 
5.1 Reliability Models for Internal Corrosion 
Based on the eleven largest natural gas pipeline operators’ data from 2001 to 
2011, 98 internal corrosion failures were recorded. Table 5.1 shows the total number of 
failures from 2001 to 2011 for each observation year. 
Table 5.1 Number of Incidents Recorded per Year Due to Internal Corrosion 
Year incident occurred Number of total incidents 
2001 5 
2002 7 
2003 7 
2004 9 
2005 5 
2006 8 
2007 9 
2008 7 
2009 10 
2010 18 
2011 13 
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The cumulative number of failures for internal corrosion is shown in Figure 5.1. 
The plot represents incidents data from 2001 to 2011 and decades of installation from 
pre 1940 to 2011. As noted in Section 4, each pipeline has different failure 
characteristics by installation decade.  Due to this reason, these 98 incident data was 
divided into sub-groups, which are 1950-1959, 1960-1969, 1970-1979, and 1980-1989 
based on the decade of installation. Before 1950 and after 1989 failure data are not 
considered because majority of data is between from 1950 to 1989. 
 
Figure 5.1 Internal Corrosion Cumulative Number of Failure Plot from 2001 to 2011 
As mentioned before, there is not any geographical data so there is not any 
information of individual line’s length. However, PHMSA provides total pipeline miles 
by the decade of installation for the each company. The total miles and failures were 
shown in Appendix F. 
As noted in Section 2, the power law model is a feasible model for the estimation 
of expected number of corrosion failures. Although reliability improves with 
maintenance, corrosion continues to reduce pipeline reliability. Therefore, pipeline 
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reliability links to a growing number of failures with pipeline’s service time. To show 
the relation between reliability and failures, the cumulative number of failures caused by 
internal corrosion was analyzed in MATLAB for predetermined groups, based on 
Equation 2.6. Table 5.2 illustrates the results of the analysis. θ and β scale and shape 
parameters were calculated with Equations 2.7 and 2.8. Equation 2.9 was used to 
produce the 95 percent confidence intervals for shape parameter β. A complete set of 
cumulative plots showing the observed number of failures for all predetermined decades 
of installation is shown in Appendix C.  
Table 5.2 Cumulative Number of Failures (N(t))’ Scale and Shape Parameters and 95 
Percent Confidence Intervals of Failures Rate of the Internal Corrosion Incidents 
Cause 
Decade of 
Installation 
Number 
of 
Incident 
?̂? ?̂? 
95% Confidence 
Intervals for β 
In
te
rn
a
l 
C
o
rr
o
si
o
n
 Overall 98 1.333 0.353 1.082 1.610 
1950-1959 12 0.954 0.812 0.493 1.564 
1960-1969 25 1.633 1.532 1.057 2.333 
1970-1979 32 1.778 1.566 1.216 2.445 
1980-1989 20 0.957 0.480 0.584 1.419 
According to the results in Table 5.2, reliability of pipeline systems is 
deteriorating for internal corrosion failures for overall, 1960-1969, and 1970-1979. For 
1950-1959 and 1980-1989 the estimator β is less than 1; therefore, probability of failure 
will occur less frequent. Based on the result at Table 5.2, the β estimator is not enough to 
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determine if the system deteriorates or improves over time. As discussed in the literature 
review, the failure trend can be modeled by an NHPP. Therefore, accuracy of the NHPP 
has to be tested. 
Although the non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) is selected to model 
pipeline systems, adequacy of the NHPP must be tested to verify the model. The null 
hypothesis is H0: β=1 or the HPP model is the best model for internal corrosion failures 
data with α=0.05. The alternative hypothesis is H1: β≠1 or the power law process is the 
best model for internal corrosion failures data with α=0.05. Equation 2.11 was used to 
test the adequacy of the HPP.  
Table 5.3 Test the Null Hypothesis to Verify Model for Internal Corrosion Failures 
Cause Decade of 
Installation 
𝟐𝑵(𝑻𝒐𝒃𝒔)
?̂?
 
𝝌𝟏−𝜶/𝟐
𝟐
(𝟐𝑵(𝑻𝒐𝒃𝒔)
)
 𝝌𝜶/𝟐
𝟐
(𝟐𝑵(𝑻𝒐𝒃𝒔)
)
 Reject H0: HPP 
with α=0.05 
In
te
rn
a
l 
C
o
rr
o
si
o
n
 Overall 147.04 159.122 236.663 Yes 
1950-1959 25.17 12.401 39.364 No 
1960-1969 30.62 32.357 71.420 Yes 
1970-1979 36.00 43.776 88.004 Yes 
1980-1989 41.81 24.433 59.347 No 
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 5.3. According to the results, the 
null hypothesis is rejected for internal corrosion with α=0.05 for the decade of 
installation of all data, 1960-1969, and 1970-1979. Based on the results, the pipeline 
systems for internal corrosion failures can be modeled by the power law process for all 
70 
 
data, 1960-1969, and 1970-1979. Otherwise, the HPP model is the best model for the 
decade of installation for 1950-1959 and 1980-1989. The average failure rates were 
calculated for 1950-1959 and 1980-1989. Equation 2.3 and 2.4 were used to analyze 
failure rates based on the HPP model. Table 5.4 provides the results of the estimations 
with the significance level at 5 percent for the HPP.  
Table 5.4 Estimates and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Failure Rate of the Pipeline 
Systems for Internal Corrosion 
Cause Decade of 
Installation 
?̂?(𝒕) (𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓) 95% Confidence Intervals (per 
mile year) 
Internal 
Corrosion 
1950-1959 3.17263E-05 1.63935E-05 5.20365E-05 
1980-1989 0.000232051 0.000141725 0.000344248 
Results of table 5.3 and Table 5.4 are summarized in Table 5.5. The final 
expressions are given for the cumulative number of failures for each predetermined 
decade of installation for internal corrosion. 
Table 5.5 Reliability Trend in the Pipeline Systems for Internal Corrosion 
Cause Decade of 
Installation 
Best 
Model 
N (t) ?̂?(𝒕) per mile year Reliability 
Trend 
In
te
rn
a
l 
C
o
rr
o
si
o
n
 
Overall NHPP 3.842𝑡1.333 5.04𝑥10−5𝑡0.333 Deterioration 
1950-1959 HPP 1.022𝑡0.9535 3.17263E-05 Stationary 
1960-1969 NHPP 0.4618𝑡1.633 2.96𝑥10−5𝑡0.633 Deterioration 
1970-1979 NHPP 0.425𝑡1.778 9.73𝑥10−5𝑡0.778 Deterioration 
1980-1989 HPP 2.293𝑡0.9566 0.000232051 Stationary 
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Summary of beta shape parameters and 95 percent confidence internals results 
are illustrated in Figure 5.2. The expected results were beta parameters increase with 
increasing network age. In other words, the network’s failure intensity increases with 
increasing pipes’ age. The results indicate that with increasing the network age, beta 
parameters increase, except the beta parameter for the decade of 1950-1959. This result 
can be explained with the effectiveness of the industry efforts to control corrosion.  
 
Figure 5.2 Estimates of the β Parameters and 95 Percent of Confidence Intervals of the 
Failure Rate of the Internal Corrosion 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the recorded cumulative failures and the estimated 
cumulative failures for internal corrosion from 2001 to 2011. These plots might be used 
to graphically evaluate the power law results with recorded failures. According to the 
power law model results, 94 failures were evaluated compared to the recorded data that 
was 98 failures. Beta parameter is more than 1. It means that the system a deteriorating 
networks when includes all internal corrosion failure data. In other words, the future 
Overall 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989
BETA 1.333 0.954 1.633 1.778 0.957
CI(95%)Lower 1.082 0.493 1.057 1.216 0.584
CI(95%)Upper 1.610 1.564 2.333 2.445 1.419
0.400
0.900
1.400
1.900
2.400
2.900
β
Decade of Installation
Internal Corrosion β Confidence Interval for Cumulative 
Number of Failures (95%) 
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failures will most properly occur due to internal corrosion for natural gas transmission 
pipelines.  
 
Figure 5.3 Cumulative Failures Plot for Internal Corrosion for the Period 2001-2011 
Similar plots are also made for each group for internal corrosion mode. A 
complete set of cumulative plots for all groups are given in Appendix C. 
5.2 Reliability Models for External Corrosion 
46 external corrosion failures were recorded based on the eleven largest natural 
gas transmission pipeline operators’ data from 2001 to 2011. Table 5.6 shows the total 
number of failures from 2001 to 2011 for each observation year.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Observed 5 12 19 28 33 41 50 57 67 85 98
Power 4 10 17 24 33 42 51 61 72 83 94
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Table 5.6 Number of Incidents Recorded per Year Due to External Corrosion 
Year incident occurred Number of total incidents 
2001 0 
2002 4 
2003 4 
2004 5 
2005 4 
2006 7 
2007 7 
2008 6 
2009 3 
2010 5 
2011 1 
The cumulative number of failures for external corrosion is shown in Figure 5.3. 
Failure data in the plot represent the whole decades of installation from pre 1940 to 
2011. As mentioned earlier, age is an important factor for reliability analysis. Due to this 
reason, these 46 incident data were divided into sub-groups, which are 1920-1929, 1930-
1939, 1940-1949, 1950-1959, and 1960-1969, based on decade of installation. Before 
1920 and after 1969 failure data are not considered because majority of data is between 
from 1920 to 1969. 
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Figure 5.4 External Corrosion Cumulative Number of Failure Plot from 2001 to 2011 
As discussed in Section 1, there is not any geographical data so there is not any 
information of individual line’s length. In contrast, PHMSA provides total pipeline miles 
by the decade of installation for each company. The total miles and failures were shown 
in Appendix F. 
As noted in Section 2, the power law model is a feasible model for corrosion 
failures. Although reliability improves with maintenance, corrosion continues to reduce 
pipeline reliability. Therefore, pipeline reliability links to a growing number of failures 
with pipeline’s service time. To show the relation between reliability and failures, the 
cumulative number of failures caused by external corrosion was analyzed in MATLAB 
for predetermined time periods based on Equation 2.6. Table 5.7 shows the results of the 
analysis. θ and β scale and shape parameters were calculated with Equation 2.7 and 2.8. 
Equation 2.9 was used to produce the 95 percent confidence intervals for shape 
parameter β. A complete set of cumulative plots showing the observed number of 
failures for all predetermined decades of installation is shown in Appendix D.  
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Table 5.7 Cumulative Number of Failures (N(t))’ Scale and Shape Parameters and 95 
Percent Confidence Intervals of Failures Rate of the External Corrosion Incidents 
Cause 
Decade of 
Installation 
Number 
of 
Incident 
?̂? ?̂? 
95% Confidence 
Intervals for β 
E
x
te
rn
a
l 
C
o
rr
o
si
o
n
 
Overall 46 1.272 0.542 0.931 1.665 
1920-1929 3 0.954 3.478 0.197 2.298 
1930-1939 2 2.219 8.049 0.269 6.182 
1940-1949 11 1.118 1.288 0.558 1.869 
1950-1959 9 1.970 3.606 0.901 3.450 
1960-1969 14 0.999 0.783 0.546 1.586 
 According to the results in Table 5.7, the reliability of pipeline systems is 
deteriorating for external corrosion failures for overall, 1930-1939,1940-1949, and 1950-
1959. For 1920-1929 and 1960-1969 the estimator β is less than 1; therefore, probability 
of failure will occur less frequently. Although the β estimator is an important variable on 
how the system deteriorates or improves over time, it is not enough itself. 
Although the non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) is selected to model 
pipeline systems, adequacy of the NHPP must be tested to verify the model. The null 
hypothesis is H0:β=1 or the HPP model is the best model for external corrosion failures 
data with α=0.05. The alternative hypothesis is H1: β≠1 or the power law process is the 
best model for external corrosion failures data with α=0.05. Equation 2.11 was used to 
test the adequacy of the HPP.  
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Table 5.8 Test the Null Hypothesis to Verify Model for External Corrosion Failures 
Cause 
Decade of 
Installation 
𝟐𝑵(𝑻𝒐𝒃𝒔)
?̂?
 
𝝌𝟏−𝜶/𝟐
𝟐
(𝟐𝑵(𝑻𝒐𝒃𝒔)
)
 𝝌𝜶/𝟐
𝟐
(𝟐𝑵(𝑻𝒐𝒃𝒔)
)
 Reject H0: 
HPP with 
α=0.05 
E
x
te
rn
a
l 
C
o
rr
o
si
o
n
 
Overall 72.33 67.356 120.427 Yes 
1920-1929 6.29 1.237 14.449 No 
1930-1939 1.80 0.484 11.143 No 
1940-1949 19.68 10.982 36.781 Yes 
1950-1959 9.14 8.231 31.526 Yes 
1960-1969 28.03 15.308 44.461 Yes 
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 5.8. According to the results, the 
null hypothesis is rejected for external corrosion with α=0.05 for the decade of 
installation all of data, 1940-1949, 1950-1959, and 1960-1969. Based on the results, the 
pipeline systems for external corrosion failures can be modeled by the power law 
process for all data, 1940-1949, 1950-1959, and 1960-1969. On the other hand, the HPP 
model is the best model for the decade of installation for 1920-1929 and 1930-1939. The 
average failure rates were calculated for 1920-1929 and 1930-1939. Equation 2.3 and 2.4 
were used to analyze failure rates on the basis of the HPP model. Table 5.9 shows the 
results of the estimations with the significance level at 5 percent.  
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Table 5.9 Estimates and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals for Failure Rate of the Pipeline 
Systems for External Corrosion 
Cause Decade of 
Installation 
?̂?(𝒕) (𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓) 95% Confidence Intervals 
(per mile year) 
External 
Corrosion 
1920-1929 5.40722E-05 1.11506E-05 0.000130218 
1930-1939 3.60481E-05 4.36543E-06 0.000100442 
Table 5.10 shows the final expressions for the cumulative number of failures for 
each predetermined decade of installation for external corrosion.  
Table 5.10 Reliability Trend in the Pipeline Systems for External Corrosion 
Cause Decade of 
Installation 
Best 
Model 
N(t) ?̂?(𝒕) (𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒆 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓) Reliability 
Trend 
E
x
te
rn
a
l 
C
o
rr
o
si
o
n
 
Overall NHPP 2.426𝑡1.272 2.62𝑥10−5𝑡0.272 Deterioration 
1920-1929 HPP 0.2981𝑡0.9542 5.40722E-05 Stationary 
1930-1939 HPP 0.01196𝑡2.219 3.60481E-05 Stationary 
1940-1949 NHPP 0.852𝑡1.118 7.21𝑥10−5𝑡0.118 Deterioration 
1950-1959 NHPP 0.07754𝑡1.97 4.58𝑥10−6𝑡0.970 Deterioration 
1960-1969 NHPP 1.448𝑡0.999 4.65𝑥10−5𝑡−0.001 Improvement 
Summary of beta shape parameters and 95 percent confidence internals results 
are shown in Figure 5.4. The expected results with increasing the network age, beta 
parameter increase, such as internal corrosion. However, the results illustrate that there is 
not real trend for beta parameters with increasing network age. The beta parameters 
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begin to decrease with 1960-1969. This result can be explained with the effectiveness of 
the industry efforts to control corrosion and 49 CFR Parts 191, 195. 
 
Figure 5.5 Estimates of the β Parameters and 95 Percent of Confidence Intervals of the 
Failure Rate of the External Corrosion 
Figure 5.6 illustrates the recorded cumulative failures and the estimated 
cumulative failures for external corrosion from 2001 to 2011. According to the power 
law model results, 51failures were evaluated compared to the recorded data that was 46 
failures. Beta parameter is more than 1. It means that the system a deteriorating networks 
when includes all external corrosion failure data. In other words, the future failures will 
most properly occur due to external corrosion for natural gas transmission pipelines. 
Overall 1920-1929 1930-1939 1940-1949 1950-1959 1960-1969
BETA 1.272 0.954 2.219 1.118 1.970 0.999
CI(95%)Lower 0.931 0.197 0.269 0.558 0.901 0.546
CI(95%)Upper 1.665 2.298 6.182 1.869 3.450 1.586
0.000
2.000
4.000
6.000
β
Decade of Installation
External Corrosion β Confidence Interval for Cumulative Number 
of Failures (95%) 
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Figure 5.6 Cumulative Failures Plot for External Corrosion for the Period 2001-2011 
Similar plots are also made for each group for external corrosion mode. A 
complete set of cumulative plots for all groups are given in Appendix D. 
5.3 Summary 
The natural gas transmission pipeline networks are analyzed using with 
stochastic point processes. The pipeline failure mode is divided into internal and external 
corrosion. Moreover, internal corrosion failure mode is divided into five groups that 
represent the decade of pipes’ installation year. As different from internal corrosion, 
external corrosion is divided into six groups that consist of different decade of 
installation.  
Each pipeline network is analyzed separately. Two statistical models, HPP and 
NHPP are considered for estimation of expected number of failures. These statistical 
models use the failure data for an eleven-year observation. These two models are tested 
against each other, and then the best models are selected for each group. Based on the 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Observed 0 4 8 13 17 24 31 37 40 45 46
Power 2 6 10 14 19 24 29 34 40 45 51
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test results, the failure intensity function is calculated for each pipeline groups for 
network level. The result is given in Table 5.5 and Table 5.10.
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6. OPTIMAL MAINTENANCE MODELS FOR NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION 
PIPELINES 
 
This section introduces the development of preventive maintenance models. 
There are two main subsections. In the first subsection, the costs of preventive 
maintenance that is associated with failure and replacement of natural gas transmission 
pipelines are discussed. In the second subsection, the formulation of the cost models for 
finding the optimal preventive maintenance actions is introduced for natural gas 
transmission pipeline networks. 
6.1 Preventive Maintenance Model Specification 
In the literature review, an application of preventive maintenance (PM) on the 
natural gas transmission pipelines is discussed. The purpose of the PM activities is to 
minimize the overall cost of system operation and to maximize the overall reliability of 
the system. The main problem of PM is the sequence of PM actions that are maintenance 
or replacement in the pipeline networks for each time period (Moghaddam and Usher, 
2011). 
As mentioned in the literature review, reliability and maintenance are closely 
related to each other and to obtain the optimal maintenance policy requires determining 
system reliability. The results of the reliability analysis are given in Table 5.5 and Table 
5.10.  
The second step is to formulate the optimal maintenance actions based on the 
system reliability and characteristics. Optimization of preventive maintenance refers to 
82 
 
combining many situations and systems, then selecting the best solution from all feasible 
results. Hence, selection of the best solution requires complex engineering and economic 
analysis. To find the optimization models consist of two main subsections. The first 
subsection involves finding costs associated with preventive maintenance. The second 
subsection includes finding optimum costs and time for preventive maintenance actions.   
6.2 Costs of Preventive Maintenance and Replacement Actions 
The operator would like to estimate their future operating expenditure (OPEX) 
accurately. The biggest part of OPEX is the costs of unplanned system failures. There is 
no model that can predict such failures correctly on time. However, if the pipeline 
systems have a high ROCOF throughout their life, expected failure could most likely 
happen. Then the operators can estimate their OPEX based on the expected number of 
failures. In contrast, a low ROCOF may cause a low cost of failure in the same time 
intervals. Because of the above reason, the expected number of failures should be 
estimated for accurate estimation of OPEX (Moghaddam and Usher, 2011).  
The expected number of failures is estimated with the NHPP. The results of the 
number of failure functions are shown in Table 5.5 and Table 5.10. If the failure costs 
are known, future OPEX can be figured out by the results of the number of failures 
(Moghaddam and Usher, 2011). 
The costs of maintenance are associated with corrosion can be determined with 
engineering analysis. The costs of maintenance are affected either directly or indirectly 
by maintenance and are divided into two: direct and indirect costs of maintenance. The 
direct costs involve cost of manpower, material, tools, equipment, and overhead. The 
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indirect costs include material losses, excessive energy consumption, delay in fulfilling 
orders, legal, etc. (Blischke and Murthy, 2000). Thompson (2000) discusses that indirect 
costs that are associated with corrosion are more difficult to understand and to assign 
value. It could be explained by inherent properties of the impact of corrosion. More 
specifically for pipeline systems, indirect costs involve costs associated with damages to 
the environments or disruption, public relations costs, legal costs, lost revenue, etc. 
(Thompson, 2004). 
Property damage cost can be used in the study for determining direct 
maintenance costs. The PHMSA provides detail of total dollar amount of property 
damages for each pipeline incident in PHMSA’s database. Due to the Code of Federal 
Regulations (49 CFR 191.15), all relevant costs associated with corrosion available at 
the time of submission must be included on the written incidents reports. The property 
cost includes all direct costs of the incident such as property damage to the operator’s 
facilities and the property of others, facility repair and replacement, and the 
environmental cleanup and damage. The average property damages cost, which is 
Fproperty ($ per failure) for each predetermined the decades of installation is illustrated in 
Table 6.1. Due to above reason, property cost reflects the actual failure cost. Based on 
minimal repair assumption, the cost model needs cost of failure. Therefore, property 
damage cost is used as Cfailure, which denotes cost of failure (Thompson, 2004).  
As discussed in the literature review, the most appropriate approach is to repair 
the pipes until the failure costs clearly outweigh the replacement cost, or until new 
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pipeline projects make replacement economically attractive (Røstum, 2000). Therefore, 
maintenance is the most effective way to reduce ROCOF of the pipeline systems. 
Repair techniques are various from the installation of a reinforcing sleeve to full 
replacement when failure occur. Corrosion failures can be either leaks or ruptures for 
both internal and external corrosion. Baker Jr. (2008) emphasized that leaks generally do 
not cause property damage. Conversely, ruptures are more likely to cause an explosion 
and fire. 
The main external repair techniques are: the cut out and replace, the bypass, 
grinding, the weld depositions, the metallic sleeves, and the composite sleeve (Batisse 
and Hertz-Clemens, 2008). Thompson (2004) implied that for localized corrosion flaws, 
composite sleeves, steel sleeves, or replacement of the pipe segment are the most 
commonly used techniques for corrosion repair actions. Local flaws repairing process 
depends on company procedures and criteria. These kinds of problems are generally 
solved with composite sleeves and steel sleeves process. Conversely, the companies 
consider replacement or rehabilitation actions when large-scale corrosion or coating 
deterioration problem occurs.
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Table 6.1 Property Damages for Each Predetermined Decade of Installation 
Cause Decade of 
Installation 
Average Property Damage 
Due to Corrosion (per 
failure) 
Average Standard 
Deviation 
In
te
rn
a
l 
C
o
rr
o
si
o
n
 Overall $563,481 $856,348 
1950-1959 $200,172 $229,851 
1960-1969 $715,519 $1,412,253 
1970-1979 $589,603 $537,857 
1980-1989 $690,259 $736,810 
E
x
te
rn
a
l 
C
o
rr
o
si
o
n
 
Overall $2,694,061 $12,914,999 
1920-1929 $185,603 $175,889 
1930-1939 $273,107 $287,543 
1940-1949 $703,621 $1,005,536 
1950-1959 $2,027,638 $3,861,197 
1960-1969 $6,764,024 $23,247,348 
As mentioned previously, all relevant costs associated with corrosion available at 
the time of submission must be included on the written incidents reports. The costs of 
repair (composite sleeve, steel sleeve, and pipe replacement) are included to the property 
damage cost. Therefore, it requires no extra effort to find the cost of each repair 
techniques.  
The optimal maintenance models not only the cost of a corrective maintenance 
action through minimal repair but also need cost of a PM action involving replacing a 
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nonfailed component by a new one (Blischke and Murthy, 2000). ASRC Constructors 
Inc., Michael Baker Jr. Inc., and Norstar Pipeline Company (2007) conducted a technical 
report for Alaska spur pipelines for summarizing the detailed construction costs. In the 
study, direct and indirect construction costs, material (include freight) costs, 
miscellaneous costs, and project indirect costs are evaluated for different length of the 
gas transmission pipelines. The detail of the pipeline cost estimation is given in 
Appendix H. Based on the estimation, the average cost of new construction pipeline for 
Alaska Spur Gas Pipeline projects is estimated as $2,245,823 per mile. Let Creplacement 
denote the average cost of replacement cost in this thesis. Moreover, it is assumed that 
all of the replacement is related to corrosion (Thompson, 2004; ASRC Constructors Inc. 
et al., 2007). 
As discussed in Section 2, several considerations require making a final decision 
on whether a pipeline section should be maintained or replaced. For both rehabilitation 
and replacement decision is part of preventive maintenance policy. In the literature 
review detail of preventive maintenance is discussed. Based on this information, optimal 
values for the policy times could be determined by analyzing appropriate cost models 
(Nachlas, 2005). The following subsection is formulated the optimal cost model for the 
natural gas transmission pipeline networks. 
6.3 Cost Models (Optimization) 
The optimum a system replacement time can be done in order to balance the cost 
of maintenance against capital expenditure optimally. There are several optimal 
solutions for this problem that depend on the criteria selected for optimization. In this 
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thesis, the model, which minimizes the total expected cost per unit time for the system is 
selected. Coetzee (1997) provided a solution to optimize the maintenance strategy for 
repairable systems by adding relevant cost information (Louit et al., 2009). 
In the literature review, two main preventive maintenance policies, which are age 
policy and block policy, are discussed. After all discussions, it is decided that the 
periodic replacement with minimal repair at failure policy is feasible option for pipeline 
systems. 
Coetzee (1997) uses the above policy in the cost models. There are two types of 
cost models, which can be applied with success repairable system cost optimization, are 
type 2 policies and type 3 (Coetzee, 1997). 
6.3.1 Type 2 Policies 
Type 2 replacement policies include the planned replacement of a system at a 
certain age with minimal repairs at breakdown up that age. In other words, preventive 
maintenance policy is based on the age of the system, and only minimal repair is made 
for each failure (Wang, 2002). These replacement policies were introduced by Barlow 
and Hunter (1960). The model assumes: 1) after each failure, only minimal repair is 
made so that the system’s failure rate is not distributed; 2) the system is restored to its 
original state after preventive maintenance (Barlow and Hunter, 1960). The model 
optimizes cost per unit time over time. T* denotes the optimal replacement time that 
minimizes the total maintenance cost. Estimation of T* is given in Equation 6.1 
(Coetzee, 1997). 
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𝑇∗ = [
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
(
1
𝜃𝛽
)(𝛽−1)𝐶𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒
]
1
𝛽
 (6.1) 
where θ>0 and β>0 are the scale (the characteristic life) and shape parameters of the 
failure intensity function, CReplacement is cost of system replacement, and CFailure is cost of 
repair of a failure (minimal repair). 
6.3.2 Type 3 Policies 
Type 3 policy involves a system replacement after an optimum number of 
failures n* has been repaired with minimal repair policy. These replacement policies 
were introduced by Makabe and Morimura (1963). The optimum number of the minimal 
repairs before the system replacement is given in Equation 6.2 (Coetzee, 1997).  
𝑛∗ =
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
(𝛽−1)𝐶𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒
 (6.2) 
where β>0 is the scale (the characteristic life) of the failure intensity function, CReplacement 
is the cost of system replacement, and CFailure is the cost of repair of a failure (minimal 
repair).  
If the total number of failure is equal to or greater than a number of minimal 
repair n*, the replacement should be done as soon as possible; otherwise, maintenance 
actions are not required (Wang, 2002). 
The pipeline failures data set is analyzed in Section 5, and the best model is 
decided for each decade on installation for internal and external corrosion. The result in 
the Table 5.5 and Table 5.10 can be used to illustrate the use of the cost models to 
optimize the system replacement strategy. 
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The optimal maintenance cost per unit time is given in Equation 6.3 (Coetzee, 
1997).  
𝐶(𝑇∗) =
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝜆(𝑡)+𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑇∗
 (6.3) 
where, λ(t) is the expected number of failures in [0,T*], Creplacement is the average cost of 
system replacement, and Crepair is the average cost of the repair of a failure ( minimal 
repair). Under minimal repair assumption, the expected number of failures can be 
expressed in the interval (T1, T2) is (Coetzee, 1997; Gertsbakh, 2000): 
λ(t) = ∫
β
θ
(
t
θ
)
β−1
𝑑𝑡
T2
T1
= (
T2
θ
)
β
− (
T1
θ
)
β
, T2 ≥ T1 ≥ 0  (6.4) 
In Table 6.1, average property damage cost is given. To find more reliable 
results, a range cost of property damage is used instead of constant cost. Cost of 
replacement is given as $2,245,823 per mile. However, selected 10-mile section will 
provide more reliable result: therefore, the cost of a corrective maintenance action 
through minimal repair is multiplied by 10-mile. 
Based on type 2 policies and Equation 6.1, the optimal replacement time is 
determined by maximizing the expected cost effectiveness. Figure 6.1 shows how the 
scheduled replacement time changes with expected cost of failure for internal corrosion 
for all internal corrosion failures (98 incidents). An illustrating example for average cost 
of property damage, when CReplacement=$22,458,230 (10 mile section) and 
CFailure=$563,481, the optimal replacement time is at T* = 13 year and the corresponding 
cost is 𝐶(𝑇∗)=$7,034,496 for overall group of internal corrosion. 
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Figure 6.1 Cost Effectiveness as Function of Scheduled Replacement Time for Internal 
Corrosion Overall Group 
Moreover, the optimal replacement time depend upon the ratio of preventive to 
corrective replacement costs. Therefore, the optimal time can be analyzed by the 
derivative of Equation 6.3. Figure 6.2 shows how the scheduled replacement time 
changes with this ration for internal corrosion for all internal corrosion failures. 
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Figure 6.2 Scheduled Replacement Time as Function of Ratio of Preventive to 
Corrective Replacement Costs for Internal Corrosion Overall Group 
Steps of the optimal cost models are repeated for external corrosion. Figure 6.3 
shows how the scheduled replacement time changes with expected cost of failure for 
external corrosion for all external corrosion failures (46 incidents). An illustrating 
example for average cost of property damage, when CReplacement=$22,458,230 (10 mile 
section) and CFailure=$2,694,061, the optimal replacement time is at T* = 8 year and the 
corresponding cost is 𝐶(𝑇∗)=$13,138,560 for overall group of external corrosion. 
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Figure 6.3 Cost Effectiveness as Function of Scheduled Replacement Time for External 
Corrosion Overall Group 
Such in internal corrosion, the optimal replacement time depend upon the ratio of 
preventive to corrective replacement costs. Therefore, the optimal time can be analyzed 
by the derivative of Equation 6.3. Figure 6.4 shows how the scheduled replacement time 
changes with this ration for internal corrosion all external corrosion failures. 
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Figure 6.4 Scheduled Replacement Time as Function of Ratio of Preventive to 
Corrective Replacement Costs for External Corrosion Overall Group 
The remaining the decades of installation are illustrated for the optimal 
maintenance cost models. The results are shown separately in Appendix H. 
In summary, the natural gas transmission pipeline system will be replaced after 
the number of minimal repairs results of analysis. The results show that the length of the 
replacement interval depends upon a ratio of the replacement costs. Therefore, cost of 
repair and cost of replacement must be analyzed carefully before evaluating cost models.
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7. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
 
This section summarizes major findings, discusses results, and suggests 
directions for future study. The section is organized in two subsections. In the first 
subsection, a summary of the thesis work is presented. In the second subsection, the 
directions for future work are suggested.  
7.1 Summary 
The purpose of this study is to formulate statistical models for the estimation of 
failure rate and to develop the optimal maintenance actions for natural gas transmission 
pipeline networks. Although much literature exists for repairable systems, there is a 
limited amount of work for natural gas pipelines. Therefore, this thesis tries to build a 
small bridge between previous studies, which are conducted for repairable systems or the 
other type of networks, and natural gas pipeline systems and to develop a method of 
maintenance optimization models establishment for pipeline systems. It is assumed that 
the readers of this thesis have some idea about the basic of theory of stochastic processes 
and reliability for repairable systems.  
This thesis work focuses on three major topics. The first topic is characterization 
of natural gas transmission pipeline system failure modes. The discussion of this topic is 
discussed in Section 2.  
The second topic is the development of reliability models to estimate the 
expected number of failures. Two reliability models are considered to explain 
characterization of pipeline failures in the literature review. It is found that the stochastic 
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point processes are the most convenient processes to use a parametric model like the 
homogeneous Poisson process (NPP) and the nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) 
for natural gas transmission pipeline systems.  
Application of the statistical models is illustrated in Section 5. The models used 
for natural gas transmission pipeline incidents data were observed from 2001 to 2011. 
Under the scope of this thesis, the pipeline networks are divided into two main groups 
(internal and external corrosion) based on failure characteristics. The following 
covariates are found to be significant: decades of installation and the number of previous 
failures.  
The point and interval estimators of the failure intensity function (NHPP) are 
evaluated and the accuracy of the stochastic models is tested for each determined failure 
mode and decade of installation. The null hypothesis shows that both HPP and NHPP are 
convenient for estimating the failure rate of transmission pipelines. Therefore, NHPP 
and HPP are highly recommended for modeling failures’ characterization in natural gas 
transmission pipeline networks for corrosion failure modes. 
The thesis illustrated that three out of five pipeline networks are deteriorating due 
to internal corrosion failures. The other two network groups have stationary behavior. 
For external corrosion failures, three out of six pipeline networks are deteriorating, two 
of them have stationary behavior, and one network is improving reliability over time.  
Based on the finding in this study, internal corrosion failures more significant 
than external corrosion. As mentioned in Section 5, there is an increasing trend of beta 
shape parameters for internal corrosion with over time. On the other hand, it is hard to 
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illustrate a trend of beta shape parameter for external corrosion with over time. The 
results can be explained that the oil and gas industry has been familiar with corrosion 
mitigation and prevention strategies due to 49 CFR Part 192. Due to the legislative 
regulation and industry effort, external corrosion has been kept under control.  
The statistical models give the expected number of failures. However, there is no 
guarantee that these failures will occur. The results of the statistical models can be used 
in reliability analysis, risk analysis, and optimum maintenance decisions. As mentioned 
earlier, the second purpose of this study is to optimize maintenance for pipeline 
networks. Therefore, the results of statistical models underlie the maintenance 
optimization models. 
The third topic is the development of optimal preventive maintenance actions for 
gas pipelines. Details of the maintenance models are presented in Section 2 and Section 
6. Maintenance actions can be divided into two major classes: preventive maintenance 
and corrective maintenance. Corrective maintenance occurs as a result of failures; 
therefore, it does not affect the overall system reliability. On the other hand, preventive 
maintenance changes the system reliability.  
The optimal preventive maintenance actions are chosen based on minimal repair 
process by the non-homogeneous Poisson process assumption. Based on the minimal 
repair process, the cost model is selected. The cost model takes into consideration 
optimal preventive maintenance schedule and minimum average total cost per time unit 
criterion. In other words, the purpose of selected cost model minimizes the total 
expected cost per unit time for the pipeline networks. 
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The results of this study are a contribution to decision-makers in the gas industry 
to predict the expected number of failure in future operation more accurately and to help 
to decide proper preventive maintenance decisions. 
7.2 Directions for Future Research 
Even though this thesis work has presented a framework to estimate failure rate 
and to determine the optimal preventive maintenance decision for the natural gas 
transmission pipeline networks, it does not mean that it solves all the problems that are 
associated with reliability and maintenance optimization.  
Reliability and maintenance optimization models require further research 
attention are as follows:  
1. The development of reliability models that can predict the probability of failure 
and the expected number of failures depend upon many performance variables 
such as pressure of gas, environmental conditions, temperature, diameter, wall 
thickness, record of previous maintenance history, etc. Due to lack of 
information, the reliability models developed in this thesis consider the decades 
of installation of lines, corrosion failure mode, and the number of previous 
failures. The models can be improved by including other failure modes, multiple 
performance variables, and exact pipeline length for scope of future research. 
2. The pipes in the natural gas transmission networks are only considered in this 
work. However, pipeline systems consist of pipes and other subcomponents such 
as compressors, valves, metering stations, etc. For more accurate reliability 
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analysis for the entire pipeline network, whole subcomponents performance 
should be considered. 
3. The development of preventive maintenance models depends on many variables 
such as different maintenance restoration degrees. The optimal preventive 
maintenance models developed in this thesis consider minimal repair restoration 
degrees. Other maintenance restoration degrees such as imperfect or perfect 
could be included in the scope of future research. 
4. The development of preventive maintenance models considers the periodic 
replacement with minimal repair at failure policy. On the other hand, some other 
models consider previous maintenance time and frequency of maintenance until 
preventive maintenance actions are taken. Therefore, other possible applications 
of preventive maintenance could be considered for future research. 
5. The accuracy of the optimization models generally depends upon two variables: 
accuracy of failure intensity functions and accuracy of cost. Accuracy of failure 
intensity functions can be improved with the first comment. However, estimating 
the costs that are associated with failure, construction conditions, and 
maintenance actions are not easily obtainable. This problem could be obviated in 
the future with a closer collaboration with the oil and gas industry, pipeline 
safety agencies, and researchers. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A-1 Summary of internal corrosion failures from 2001 to 2011-A 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number 
of total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total 
incidents 
Total Property 
Damage (PRPTY) 
Due to Corrosion 
(per failure) ($ x 
thousand) 
Average of 
PRPTY Due to 
Corrosion (per 
failure) ($ x 
thousand) 
Standard Deviation 
of PRPTY Due to 
Corrosion (per 
failure) ($ x 
thousand) 
Galvanic 
Corrosion 
Microbiological 
Corrosion 
Other 
2001 5 5 
55,221 563 856 
2  3 
2002 7 12 3 1 3 
2003 7 19 3 2 2 
2004 9 28 2 7  
2005 5 33  3 2 
2006 8 41 4 4  
2007 9 50 2 6 1 
2008 7 57  4 1 
2009 10 67 4 4 2 
2010 18 85    
2011 13 98    
      Total: 20 Total: 31 Total: 14 
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Table A-2 Summary of internal corrosion failures from 2001 to 2011-B 
Decade of 
installation 
Property Damage 
(PRPTY) Due to 
Corrosion (per 
failure) ($ x 
thousand) 
Pipe Diameter (in) Pipe Wall Thickness 
(in) 
Galvanic Corrosion 
($ x thousand) 
Microbiological 
Corrosion ($ x 
thousand) 
Other ($ x thousand) 
 Average Standard 
Deviation 
Average Standard 
Deviation 
Average Standard 
Deviation 
Average Standard 
Deviation 
Average Standard 
Deviation 
Average Standard 
Deviation 
Overall 563 856           
1950-1959 200 229 14.17 6.45 0.31 0.07 185 45 251 280 383 500 
1960-1969 715 1,412 21.86 9.05 0.41 0.11 136 64 1,155 2,318 241 258 
1970-1979 589 537 17.72 6.16 0.44 0.13 353 305 731 548 1,393 1,706 
1980-1989 690 736 16.00 7.94 0.37 0.07 1,339 1,151 448 134 468 500 
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Table A-3 Summary of internal corrosion failures from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1950 and 1959 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total 
incidents 
Cathodic protection Coating condition 
Under CP Late 
Start 
Without 
protection 
Unknown Coated Bare Unknown 
2001 2 2 
4 3 0 5 12 0 0 
2002 1 3 
2003 1 4 
2004 0 4 
2005 1 5 
2006 0 5 
2007 0 5 
2008 1 6 
2009 1 7 
2010 3 10 
2011 2 12 
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Table A-4 Summary of internal corrosion failures from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1960 and 1969 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total 
incidents 
Cathodic protection Coating condition 
Under CP Late 
Start 
Without 
protection 
Unknown Coated Bare Unknown 
2001 1 1 
14 0 1 10 22 0 3 
2002 1 2 
2003 2 4 
2004 2 6 
2005 1 7 
2006 2 9 
2007 1 10 
2008 2 12 
2009 3 15 
2010 5 20 
2011 5 25 
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Table A-5 Summary of internal corrosion failures from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1970 and 1979 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total 
incidents 
Cathodic protection Coating condition 
Under CP Late 
Start 
Without 
protection 
Unknown Coated Bare Unknown 
2001 0 0 
18 1 0 13 28 1 3 
2002 3 3 
2003 3 6 
2004 2 8 
2005 1 9 
2006 0 9 
2007 3 12 
2008 2 14 
2009 5 19 
2010 8 27 
2011 5 32 
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Table A-6 Summary of internal corrosion failures from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1980 and 1989 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total 
incidents 
Cathodic protection Coating condition 
Under CP Late 
Start 
Without 
protection 
Unknown Coated Bare Unknown 
2001 2 2 
19 0 0 1 18 1 1 
2002 2 4 
2003 1 5 
2004 3 8 
2005 0 8 
2006 6 14 
2007 4 18 
2008 1 19 
2009 1 20 
2010 0 20 
2011 0 20 
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Table A-7 Summary of types of PM methods from 2001 to 2011 for internal corrosion 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total 
incidents 
Cathodic protection Coating condition 
Under CP Late Start Without 
protection 
Coated Bare 
2001 5 5 3 1 1 5  
2002 7 12 6 1  7  
2003 7 19 7   7  
2004 9 28 9   9  
2005 5 33 5   5  
2006 8 41 8   7 1 
2007 9 50 8 1  9  
2008 7 57 7   7  
2009 10 67 9 1  9 1 
2010 18 85 17  1 18  
2011 13 98 13   12 1 
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APPENDIX B 
Table B-1 Summary of external corrosion failures from 2001 to 2011-A 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number 
of total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total 
incidents 
Total Property 
Damage 
(PRPTY) Due 
to Corrosion 
(per failure) ($ 
x thousand) 
Average of 
PRPTY Due to 
Corrosion (per 
failure) ($ x 
thousand) 
Standard 
Deviation of 
PRPTY Due to 
Corrosion (per 
failure) ($ x 
thousand) 
Galvanic 
Corrosion 
Improper 
Cathodic 
Protection 
Microbiological 
Corrosion 
Other 
2001 0 0 
123,926 2,694 12,914 
    
2002 4 4   1 2 
2003 4 8 1   2 
2004 5 13 3 1   
2005 4 17 1   2 
2006 7 24 3  1 2 
2007 7 31 5   2 
2008 6 37 2 1 2  
2009 3 40 1   1 
2010 5 45 3  1  
2011 1 46     
      Total: 19 Total: 2 Total: 5 Total: 11 
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Table B-2 Summary of external corrosion failures from 2001 to 2011-B 
Decade of 
installation 
Property Damage (PRPTY) 
Due to Corrosion (per 
failure) ($ x thousand) 
Pipe Diameter (in) Pipe Wall Thickness 
(in) 
 Average Standard 
Deviation 
Average Standard 
Deviation 
Average Standard 
Deviation 
Overall 2,694 12,914     
1920-1929 185 175 19.54 10.69 0.26 0.03 
1930-1939 273 287 19.00 7.07 0.28 0.04 
1940-1949 703 1,005 20.73 5.88 0.32 0.08 
1950-1959 2,027 3,861 23.93 4.90 0.30 0.05 
1960-1969 6,764 23,247 21.10 11.81 0.30 0.08 
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Table B-3 Summary of external corrosion failures from 2001 to 2011-C 
Decade of 
installation 
Galvanic Corrosion ($ x 
thousand) 
Improper Cathodic 
Protection 
Microbiological Corrosion 
($ x thousand) 
Other ($ x thousand) 
 Average Standard 
Deviation 
Average Standard 
Deviation 
Average Standard 
Deviation 
Average Standard 
Deviation 
Overall         
1920-1929 220 233       
1930-1939 273 287       
1940-1949 91 28   887  1,015 1,511 
1950-1959 3,069 5,449 5,416  57  60 84 
1960-1969 408 576   70  172 103 
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Table B-4 Summary of external corrosion failures from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1920 and 1929 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total 
incidents 
Cathodic protection Coating condition 
Under CP Late 
Start 
Without 
protection 
Unknown Coated Bare Unknown 
2001 0 0 
1 0 2 0 2 1 0 
2002 1 1 
2003 0 1 
2004 0 1 
2005 0 1 
2006 1 2 
2007 0 2 
2008 0 2 
2009 0 2 
2010 1 3 
2011 0 3 
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Table B-5 Summary of external corrosion failures from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1930 and 1939 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total 
incidents 
Cathodic protection Coating condition 
Under CP Late 
Start 
Without 
protection 
Unknown Coated Bare Unknown 
2001 0 0 
0 2 0 0 0 2 0 
2002 0 0 
2003 0 0 
2004 0 0 
2005 0 0 
2006 0 0 
2007 1 1 
2008 1 2 
2009 0 2 
2010 0 2 
2011 0 2 
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Table B-6 Summary of external corrosion failures from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1940 and 1949 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total 
incidents 
Cathodic protection Coating condition 
Under CP Late 
Start 
Without 
protection 
Unknown Coated Bare Unknown 
2001 0 0 
2 9 0 0 9 2 0 
2002 0 0 
2003 2 2 
2004 1 3 
2005 3 6 
2006 2 8 
2007 0 8 
2008 2 10 
2009 0 10 
2010 1 11 
2011 0 11 
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Table B-7 Summary of external corrosion failures from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1950 and 1959 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total 
incidents 
Cathodic protection Coating condition 
Under CP Late 
Start 
Without 
protection 
Unknown Coated Bare Unknown 
2001 0 0 
4 4 1 0 9 0 0 
2002 1 1 
2003 1 2 
2004 0 2 
2005 0 2 
2006 1 3 
2007 2 5 
2008 0 5 
2009 1 6 
2010 1 7 
2011 2 9 
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Table B-8 Summary of external corrosion failures from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1960 and 1969 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total 
incidents 
Cathodic protection Coating condition 
Under CP Late 
Start 
Without 
protection 
Unknown Coated Bare Unknown 
2001 0 0 
9 1 1 3 14 0 0 
2002 2 2 
2003 1 3 
2004 2 5 
2005 1 6 
2006 2 8 
2007 3 11 
2008 0 11 
2009 1 12 
2010 1 13 
2011 1 14 
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Table B-9 Summary of types of PM methods from 2001 to 2011 for external corrosion 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total 
incidents 
Cathodic protection Coating condition 
Under CP Late Start Without 
protection 
Coated Bare 
2001 0 0 0   0  
2002 4 4 2  2 4  
2003 4 8 2 2  4  
2004 5 13 4 1  5  
2005 4 17 1 3  3 1 
2006 7 24 4 3  7  
2007 7 31 3 3 1 6 1 
2008 6 37 3 3  4 2 
2009 3 40 3   3  
2010 5 45 2 2 1 4 1 
2011 1 46 1   1  
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APPENDIX C 
 
Figure C-1 Overall number of cumulative failures for internal corrosion plot from 2001 to 2011  
 
Figure C-2 Observed cumulative failures and estimated cumulative failures plots for internal corrosion from 2001 to 2011  
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Figure C-3 Number of cumulative failures for internal corrosion plot from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 
1950 and 1959 
 
Figure C-4 Observed cumulative failures and estimated cumulative failures plots for internal corrosion from 2001 to 2011 by 
the decade of installation between 1950 and 1959 
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Figure C-5 Number of cumulative failures for internal corrosion plot from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 
1960 and 1969 
 
Figure C-6 Observed cumulative failures and estimated cumulative failures plots for internal corrosion from 2001 to 2011 by 
the decade of installation between 1960 and 1969 
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Figure C-7 Number of cumulative failures for internal corrosion plot from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 
1970 and 1979 
 
Figure C-8 Observed cumulative failures and estimated cumulative failures plots for internal corrosion from 2001 to 2011 by 
the decade of installation between 1970 and 1979 
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Figure C-9 Number of cumulative failures for internal corrosion plot from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 
1980 and 1989 
 
Figure C-10 Observed cumulative failures and estimated cumulative failures plots for internal corrosion from 2001 to 2011 by 
the decade of installation between 1980 and 1989 
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Table C-1 Summary of internal corrosion failures the maximum likelihood estimators (beta) values  
Decade of 
Installation 
Internal Corrosion Beta Shape 
Parameter 
CI (95%)Lower CI (95%)Upper 
1920-1929    
1930-1939    
1940-1949    
1950-1959 0.935 0.555 1.352 
1960-1969 1.633 1.319 1.946 
1970-1979 1.778 1.32 2.235 
1980-1989 0.9566 0.6709 1.242 
1990-1999    
2000-2009    
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Figure C-11 Summary of internal corrosion failures the maximum likelihood estimators (beta) values as a graphical
1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989
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APPENDIX D 
 
Figure D-1 Overall number of cumulative failures for external corrosion plot from 2001 to 2011 
 
Figure D-2 Observed cumulative failures and estimated cumulative failures plots for external corrosion from 2001 to 2011 
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Figure D-3 Number of cumulative failures for external corrosion plot from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 
1920 and 1929 
 
Figure D-4 Observed cumulative failures and estimated cumulative failures plots for internal corrosion from 2001 to 2011 by 
the decade of installation between 1920 and 1929 
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Figure D-5 Number of cumulative failures for external corrosion plot from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 
1930 and 1939 
 
Figure D-6 Observed cumulative failures and estimated cumulative failures plots for internal corrosion from 2001 to 2011 by 
the decade of installation between 1930 and 1939 
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Figure D-7 Number of cumulative failures for external corrosion plot from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 
1940 and 1949 
 
Figure D-8 Observed cumulative failures and estimated cumulative failures plots for internal corrosion from 2001 to 2011 by 
the decade of installation between 1940 and 1949 
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Figure D-9 Number of cumulative failures for external corrosion plot from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 
1950 and 1959 
 
Figure D-10 Observed cumulative failures and estimated cumulative failures plots for internal corrosion from 2001 to 2011 by 
the decade of installation between 1950 and 1959 
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Figure D-11 Number of cumulative failures for external corrosion plot from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation 
between 1960 and 1969 
 
Figure D-12 Observed cumulative failures and estimated cumulative failures plots for internal corrosion from 2001 to 2011 by 
the decade of installation between 1960 and 1969
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Table D-1 Summary of external corrosion failures the maximum likelihood estimators (beta) values 
Decade of 
Installation 
External Corrosion Beta 
Shape Parameter 
CI (95%)Lower CI (95%)Upper 
1920-1929 0.9542 0.6112 1.297 
1930-1939 2.219 0.8378 3.6 
1940-1949 1.118 0.7515 1.485 
1950-1959 1.97 1.507 2.432 
1960-1969 0.9989 0.8019 1.196 
1970-1979    
1980-1989    
1990-1999    
2000-2009    
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Figure D-13 Summary of external corrosion failures the maximum likelihood estimators (beta) values as a graphical
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APPENDIX E 
Table E-1 Summary of the internal corrosion of cathodic protection status for the 
selected number of failures 
Cathodic Protection Status Percentage (%) 
Cathodically Protected 94 
Cathodic Protection Started after pipe 
installation (Late Start) 
4 
Cathodically Unprotected 2 
 
Table E-2 Summary of the internal corrosion of coating status for the selected number of 
failures 
Coating Status Percentage (%) 
Coated  97 
Bare 3 
 
Table E-3 Summary of the cause of corrosion related failures for internal corrosion 
Type of Corrosion that Causes 
Failures 
Percentage (%) 
Galvanic 31 
Stray Current 0 
Improper Cathodic Protection 0 
Microbiological 48 
Stress Corrosion Cracking 0 
Other 21 
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Table E-4 Summary of the external corrosion of the cathodic protection status for the 
selected number of failures 
Cathodic Protection Status Percentage (%) 
Cathodically Protected 54 
Cathodic Protection Started after pipe 
installation (Late Start) 
37 
Cathodically Unprotected 9 
 
Table E-5 Summary of the external corrosion of the coating status for selected of 
number of failures 
Coating Status Percentage (%) 
Coated  89 
Bare 11 
 
Table E-6 Summary of the cause of the corrosion related failures for external corrosion 
Type of Corrosion that Causes 
Failures 
Percentage (%) 
Galvanic 42 
Stray Current 0 
Improper Cathodic Protection 5 
Microbiological 11 
Stress Corrosion Cracking 18 
Other 24 
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APPENDIX F 
Table F-1 Analysis of internal corrosion failure rate and cumulative failure rate per 
1,000 miles from 2001 to 2011 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total incidents 
Total mileage 
at the end of 
year (mile) 
Failure rate 
(failure/1,000 mile) 
Cumulative 
failure rate 
(failure/1,000 
mile) 
2001 5 5 92,441 0.054088554 0.054088554 
2002 7 12 107,626 0.065040046 0.1191286 
2003 7 19 107,195 0.065301553 0.184430153 
2004 9 28 111,487 0.080726901 0.265157054 
2005 5 33 107,377 0.046564907 0.311721961 
2006 8 41 106,984 0.074777537 0.386499498 
2007 9 50 106,328 0.084643744 0.471143242 
2008 7 57 106,801 0.065542457 0.536685699 
2009 10 67 106,870 0.093571629 0.630257328 
2010 18 85 106,118 0.169622496 0.799879824 
2011 13 98 105,419 0.123317429 0.923197252 
Average   105,877 0.083927023 0.42565356 
Standard 
Deviation 
  
 0.035228801 0.278268681 
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Table F-2 Analysis of internal corrosion failure rate and cumulative failure rate per 
1,000 miles from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1950 and 1959 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total incidents 
Total mileage 
at the end of 
year (mile) 
Failure rate 
(failure/1,000 mile) 
Cumulative 
failure rate 
(failure/1,000 
mile) 
2001 2 2 31,323 0.063850844 0.063850844 
2002 1 3 34,725 0.028797544 0.092648388 
2003 1 4 35,048 0.028532149 0.121180537 
2004 0 4 36,622 0 0.121180537 
2005 1 5 35,267 0.028355462 0.149535999 
2006 0 5 34,396 0 0.149535999 
2007 0 5 34,410 0 0.149535999 
2008 1 6 34,297 0.029156659 0.178692657 
2009 1 7 34,260 0.029188266 0.207880923 
2010 3 10 34,009 0.08821072 0.296091643 
2011 2 12 33,878 0.059035782 0.355127425 
Average   34,385 0.032284311 0.171387359 
Standard 
Deviation    0.028333232 0.086564739 
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Table F-3 Analysis of internal corrosion failure rate and cumulative failure rate per 
1,000 miles from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1960 and 1969 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total incidents 
Total mileage 
at the end of 
year (mile) 
Failure rate 
(failure/1,000 mile) 
Cumulative 
failure rate 
(failure/1,000 
mile) 
2001 1 1 23,545 0.042471862 0.042471862 
2002 1 2 27,695 0.03610747 0.078579333 
2003 2 4 26,761 0.074735455 0.153314788 
2004 2 6 28,523 0.07011791 0.223432698 
2005 1 7 28,017 0.035692459 0.259125156 
2006 2 9 28,070 0.07125144 0.330376597 
2007 1 10 27,970 0.035752809 0.366129406 
2008 2 12 27,915 0.071647054 0.43777646 
2009 3 15 27,871 0.107638247 0.545414707 
2010 5 20 27,618 0.1810396 0.726454306 
2011 5 25 27,578 0.181303241 0.907757547 
Average   27,415 0.082523413 0.370075715 
Standard 
Deviation    0.053565608 0.269466162 
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Table F-4 Analysis of internal corrosion failure rate and cumulative failure rate per 
1,000 miles from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1970 and 1979 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total incidents 
Total mileage 
at the end of 
year (mile) 
Failure rate 
(failure/1,000 mile) 
Cumulative 
failure rate 
(failure/1,000 
mile) 
2001 0 0 7,341 0 0 
2002 3 3 7,834 0.382944764 0.382944764 
2003 3 6 8,751 0.342816867 0.72576163 
2004 2 8 9,351 0.213880228 0.939641858 
2005 1 9 8,540 0.117094538 1.056736396 
2006 0 9 8,293 0 1.056736396 
2007 3 12 8,150 0.368077385 1.424813781 
2008 2 14 8,064 0.248004033 1.672817813 
2009 5 19 8,065 0.619952271 2.292770084 
2010 8 27 8,115 0.985877429 3.278647513 
2011 5 32 7,976 0.626899191 3.905546705 
Average   8,226 0.3550497 1.521492449 
Standard 
Deviation    0.297194797 1.200557706 
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Table F-5 Analysis of internal corrosion failure rate and cumulative failure rate per 
1,000 miles from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1980 and 1989 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total incidents 
Total mileage 
at the end of 
year (mile) 
Failure rate 
(failure/1,000 mile) 
Cumulative 
failure rate 
(failure/1,000 
mile) 
2001 2 2 7,442 0.268744961 0.268744961 
2002 2 4 7,918 0.252578064 0.521323025 
2003 1 5 7,795 0.128281703 0.649604728 
2004 3 8 8,175 0.366957036 1.016561764 
2005 0 8 8,237 0 1.016561764 
2006 6 14 7,829 0.766370243 1.782932007 
2007 4 18 7,683 0.520638772 2.303570778 
2008 1 19 7,862 0.127193305 2.430764084 
2009 1 20 7,900 0.126582823 2.557346907 
2010 0 20 7,756 0 2.557346907 
2011 0 20 7,590 0 2.557346907 
Average   7,835 0.232486082 1.605645803 
Standard 
Deviation    0.241490177 0.921285467 
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Table F-6 Analysis of external corrosion failure rate and cumulative failure rate per 
1,000 miles from 2001 to 2011 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total incidents 
Total mileage 
at the end of 
year (mile) 
Failure rate 
(failure/1,000 mile) 
Cumulative 
failure rate 
(failure/1,000 
mile) 
2001 0 0 92,441 0 0 
2002 4 4 107,626 0.037165741 0.037165741 
2003 4 8 107,195 0.037315173 0.074480914 
2004 5 13 111,487 0.044848278 0.119329192 
2005 4 17 107,377 0.037251925 0.156581118 
2006 7 24 106,984 0.065430345 0.222011462 
2007 7 31 106,328 0.065834023 0.287845485 
2008 6 37 106,801 0.056179249 0.344024735 
2009 3 40 106,870 0.028071489 0.372096223 
2010 5 45 106,118 0.04711736 0.419213583 
2011 1 46 105,419 0.009485956 0.428699539 
Average   105,877 0.038972685 0.223767999 
Standard 
Deviation    0.020819727 0.156002744 
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Table F-7 Analysis of external corrosion failure rate and cumulative failure rate per 
1,000 miles from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1920 and 1929 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total incidents 
Total mileage 
at the end of 
year (mile) 
Failure rate 
(failure/1,000 mile) 
Cumulative 
failure rate 
(failure/1,000 
mile) 
2001 0 0 4,544 0 0 
2002 1 1 5,594 0.178752895 0.178752895 
2003 0 1 5,521 0 0.178752895 
2004 0 1 5,651 0 0.178752895 
2005 0 1 5,281 0 0.178752895 
2006 1 2 5,127 0.195058619 0.373811514 
2007 0 2 5,085 0 0.373811514 
2008 0 2 4,581 0 0.373811514 
2009 0 2 4,559 0 0.373811514 
2010 1 3 5,041 0.198383531 0.572195045 
2011 0 3 4,497 0 0.572195045 
Average   5,044 0.052017731 0.304967975 
Standard 
Deviation    0.08921446 0.178467027 
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Table F-8 Analysis of external corrosion failure rate and cumulative failure rate per 
1,000 miles from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1930 and 1939 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total incidents 
Total mileage 
at the end of 
year (mile) 
Failure rate 
(failure/1,000 mile) 
Cumulative 
failure rate 
(failure/1,000 
mile) 
2001 0 0 4,544 0 0 
2002 0 0 5,594 0 0 
2003 0 0 5,521 0 0 
2004 0 0 5,651 0 0 
2005 0 0 5,281 0 0 
2006 0 0 5,127 0 0 
2007 1 1 5,085 0.196656834 0.196656834 
2008 1 2 4,581 0.218307722 0.414964556 
2009 0 2 4,559 0 0.414964556 
2010 0 2 5,041 0 0.414964556 
2011 0 2 4,497 0 0.414964556 
Average   5,044 0.037724051 0.168774096 
Standard 
Deviation    0.084070225 0.203500514 
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Table F-9 Analysis of external corrosion failure rate and cumulative failure rate per 
1,000 miles from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1940 and 1949 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total incidents 
Total mileage 
at the end of 
year (mile) 
Failure rate 
(failure/1,000 mile) 
Cumulative 
failure rate 
(failure/1,000 
mile) 
2001 0 0 10,776 0 0 
2002 0 0 11,883 0 0 
2003 2 2 12,935 0.15461925 0.15461925 
2004 1 3 11,989 0.083411935 0.238031185 
2005 3 6 11,838 0.253411125 0.49144231 
2006 2 8 11,782 0.16975234 0.66119465 
2007 0 8 11,823 0 0.66119465 
2008 2 10 11,527 0.173509009 0.834703659 
2009 0 10 11,450 0 0.834703659 
2010 1 11 11,351 0.088101139 0.922804798 
2011 0 11 11,241 0 0.922804798 
Average   11,690 0.083891345 0.520136269 
Standard 
Deviation    0.091842022 0.362915541 
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Table F-10 Analysis of external corrosion failure rate and cumulative failure rate per 
1,000 miles from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1950 and 1959 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total incidents 
Total mileage 
at the end of 
year (mile) 
Failure rate 
(failure/1,000 mile) 
Cumulative 
failure rate 
(failure/1,000 
mile) 
2001 0 0 31,323 0 0 
2002 1 1 34,725 0.028797544 0.028797544 
2003 1 2 35,048 0.028532149 0.057329692 
2004 0 2 36,622 0 0.057329692 
2005 0 2 35,267 0 0.057329692 
2006 1 3 34,396 0.029073497 0.086403189 
2007 2 5 34,410 0.058123433 0.144526622 
2008 1 6 34,297 0.029156659 0.173683281 
2009 1 7 34,260 0.029188266 0.202871547 
2010 2 9 34,009 0.058807146 0.261678693 
2011 0 9 33,878 0 0.261678693 
Average   34,385 0.023788972 0.12105715 
Standard 
Deviation    0.021914065 0.09279757 
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Table F-11 Analysis of external corrosion failure rate and cumulative failure rate per 
1,000 miles from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1960 and 1969 
Year 
incident 
occurred 
Number of 
total 
incidents 
Cumulative 
number of 
total incidents 
Total mileage 
at the end of 
year (mile) 
Failure rate 
(failure/1,000 mile) 
Cumulative 
failure rate 
(failure/1,000 
mile) 
2001 0 0 23,545 0 0 
2002 2 2 27,695 0.072214941 0.072214941 
2003 1 3 26,761 0.037367728 0.109582668 
2004 2 5 28,523 0.07011791 0.179700578 
2005 1 6 28,017 0.035692459 0.215393037 
2006 2 8 28,070 0.07125144 0.286644477 
2007 3 11 27,970 0.107258428 0.393902905 
2008 0 11 27,915 0 0.393902905 
2009 1 12 27,871 0.035879416 0.429782321 
2010 1 13 27,618 0.03620792 0.465990241 
2011 1 14 27,578 0.036260648 0.502250889 
Average   27,415 0.045659172 0.277214996 
Standard 
Deviation    0.03219282 0.172389059 
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APPENDIX G 
Table G-1 Estimation of new natural gas pipeline construction costs (ASRC 
Constructors Inc. et al., 2007) 
 Construction 
Costs (cost 
/ft.) 
Markup 
(cost /ft.) 
Material 
Costs 
(cost /ft.) 
Miscellaneous 
Costs (cost 
/ft.) 
Project 
Indirect 
Costs 
(cost /ft.) 
Total 
Project 
Costs 
(cost /ft.) 
Project 1 $150.72 $30.14 $144.10 $30.35 $66.85 $422.16 
Project 2 $150.09 $30.02 $143.64 $45.68 $66.85 $436.28 
Project 3 $181.03 $36.21 $148.35 $53.48 $66.85 $485.92 
Project 4 $143.77 $28.75 $131.49 $51.24 $67.11 $422.36 
Project 5 $166.90 $33.38 $131.79 $80.04 $67.11 $479.22 
Project 6 $150.46 $30.09 $143.30 $44.95 $66.85 $435.65 
Average $157.16 $31.43 $140.45 $50.96 $66.94 $446.93 
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Figure G-1 Cost effectiveness as function of scheduled replacement time for internal 
corrosion from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1960 and 1969 
Figure G-2 Scheduled replacement time as function of ratio of preventive to corrective 
replacement costs for internal corrosion from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation 
between 1960 and 1969 
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Figure G-4 Cost effectiveness as function of scheduled replacement time for internal 
corrosion from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1970 and 1979 
 
Figure G-4 Scheduled replacement time as function of ratio of preventive to corrective 
replacement costs for internal corrosion from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation 
between 1970 and 1979 
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Figure G-5 Cost effectiveness as function of scheduled replacement time for external 
corrosion from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1940 and 1949 
 
Figure G-6 Scheduled replacement time as function of ratio of preventive to corrective 
replacement costs for external corrosion from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation 
between 1940 and 1949 
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Figure G-7 Cost effectiveness as function of scheduled replacement time for external 
corrosion from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation between 1950 and 1959 
 
Figure G-8 Scheduled replacement time as function of ratio of preventive to corrective 
replacement costs for external corrosion from 2001 to 2011 by the decade of installation 
between 1950 and 1959 
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Figure G-1 Pipeline cost estimates for Alaska spur gas pipeline study-project 1 (ASRC 
Constructors Inc. et al., 2007) 
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Figure G-2 Pipeline cost estimates for Alaska spur gas pipeline study-project 2 (ASRC 
Constructors Inc. et al., 2007) 
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Figure G-3 Pipeline cost estimates for Alaska spur gas pipeline study-project 3 (ASRC 
Constructors Inc. et al., 2007) 
 
